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INTRODUCTION

On January 26, 2009,1 Nadya Suleman delivered octuplets, setting off a media frenzy.
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1

Randal C. Archibald et al., Octuplets, 6 Siblings, And Many Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009, at A14,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/world/americas/04iht-04octuplets.19914715.html.
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While initially greeted with amazement, public reaction quickly turned ugly, as details about the
conception and Ms. Suleman, dubbed the “Octomom,” came to light. She was an unemployed,
single mother who used a worker’s compensation settlement to finance her in vitro fertilization
(IVF).2 In a typical IVF cycle, the woman undergoes ovarian stimulation with fertility drugs,
followed by an egg retrieval procedure. Suitable eggs are then combined with sperm in the
laboratory. Eggs that successfully fertilize and develop into embryos of sufficient quality are
eligible for transfer to the woman’s uterus.3 Suleman’s physician implanted twelve embryos, far
more than recommended by the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM).4 To make
matters worse, she already had six children, also conceived through IVF,5 three of whom were
receiving public assistance for developmental disabilities.6
Reaction to the news was swift. The paparazzi swarmed, making Suleman an instant
celebrity with her own reality-TV show.7 But the attention generated by Suleman and her
octuplets did more than create another example of infotainment excess. It prompted rapid
legislative response,8 investigation by the state medical disciplinary board9 and by the ASRM10
into the conduct of Suleman’s physician, the filing of a guardianship petition to monitor the
octuplets’ finances,11 and widespread debate among academics12 and the public13 about the

2

The Associated Press, California Medical Board Probes Octuplet Birth, Feb. 6, 2009, MSNBC.COM,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29057426/; Dateline NBC, Meet Nadya Suleman, Mother of Octuplets, MSNBC.COM (Feb.
10, 2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/291129311).
3

See generally AM. SOC’Y FOR REPRODUCTIVE MED., ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHS.: A GUIDE FOR
PATIENTS 4-9 (2008), available at http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/Resources/Patient_Resources/
Fact_Sheets_and_Info_Booklets/ART.pdf.
4

It was widely reported at the time of the birth that Suleman’s physician, Dr. Michael Kamrava, had
transferred six embryos, two of which split into twins. Alan Duke, Medical Society Boots Doctor Who Did IVF, CNN.COM
(Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/SHOWBIZ/10/19/octomom.doctor/index.html?iref=allsearch. However, Dr.
Kamrava admitted at his disciplinary hearing before the California Medical Board that he had transferred twelve embryos
– all of the available fresh embryos from Suleman’s latest IVF cycle. Molly Henessey-Fiske, Suleman Doctor Says He
Was Wrong; He Shouldn’t Have Implanted a Dozen Embryos, the Fertility Specialist Testifies, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2010,
at LATExtra 1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/22/local/la-me-1022-octuplets-doctor-20101022.
5

Id.

6

Jessica Garrison & Garrett Therolf, Octuplets’ Mother Receives Public Assistance, L.A. NOW, Feb. 9,
2009, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/02/nadya-suleman-w.htm.
7
8

See Duke, supra note 4.
See infra text accompanying notes 28-31 (discussing various legislative responses to the octuplet’s birth).

9

After an extensive hearing, Administrative Law Judge Daniel Juarez found, inter alia, that Kamrava’s
transfer of twelve embryos to Nadya Suleman, as well as an earlier transfer of eight embryos to her in an unsuccessful
cycle, constituted gross negligence. In the Matter of First Amended Accusation Against Michael Kamrava, Proposed
Decision, Dec. 20, 2010, at 32, ¶ 13 [hereinafter Kamrava, Proposed Decision]. He recommended that Kamrava retain his
medical license but be placed on five years probation, during which time he would be required to take an ethics course and
practice under supervision. Id. at 41-43. The California Medical Board rejected Judge Juarez’ recommendation of
probation and is undertaking a review of the case before issuing a final ruling on license revocation. Molly HennessyFiske, Doctor Could Still Lose License, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011, at AA2.
10

Press release, Am. Soc’y for Reproductive Med., ASRM Reacts to Latest News about California
Octuplets, http://www.asrm.org/news/article.aspx?id=628&terms=(+%40Publish_To+Both+Sites+or+%40Publish_To+
ASRM+ Only+)+and+suleman (last accessed Apr. 24, 2010).
11

The Associated Press, Court Rules in Favor of Octuplets’ Mother, S.D. UNION-TRIB., Jan. 10, 2010, at
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current use of assisted reproductive technology (ART) in our society. In particular, the case
brought to the fore concerns over the perceived unregulated nature of ART practice.14
Calls for regulation of ART are nothing new.15 However, the reaction to Suleman was so
vitriolic and inextricably related to her identity as a mother that it seemed appropriate to look
more closely at the “post-Octomom” calls to action. For these reasons, this article will focus on
those areas of concern and potential regulation that have been raised by the Suleman case and,
more specifically, legislative efforts to limit the number of embryos transferred in any IVF cycle.
Part I begins by considering what exactly is so troubling about the Octomom and identifying
specific responses to those concerns. Part II hones in on one set of responses—proposed embryo
transfer limits—and assesses their constitutionality, as constitutional law has served as an
important bulwark against attacks on reproductive freedom.16 Part III considers whether, if such

A4; Tracey Garcia, Octuplet Guardianship Proceedings Halted by State Appeals Court, WHITTIER DAILY NEWS, Aug. 7,
2009, available at http://www.whittierdailynews.com/octuplets/ci_13017810.
12

See Naomi Cahn & Jennifer M. Collins, Eight Is Enough, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 501 (2009); June Carbone,
Who Decides What Number of Children is “Right?” 104 NW. U. L. REV. 109 (2009); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Why We
Should Ignore The “Octomom”, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 120 (2009).
13

Jessica Garrison et al., Octuplets’ Birth Spawns Outrage From Public, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/07/local/me-octuplets7.
14

Stephanie Saul, Birth of Octuplets Puts Focus on Fertility Industry and Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/12/health/12ivf.html (“The issue has taken on renewed scrutiny since
. . . Nadya Suleman . . . gave birth to octuplets near here last month . . . . [U]nlike some other countries, the United States
has no laws to enforce those guidelines.”); see Cahn & Collins, supra note 12, at 503; see Carbone, supra note 12.
Concern that ART lacks sufficient regulation predates the Suleman case. See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Equal
Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457 (2008) (stating that
“Regulating reproductive technologies . . . is a theoretical issue right now because there is virtually no such regulation in
the United States” and describing “the regulatory vacuum surrounding [ART]”); Jennifer Rosato, The Children, Birth of
ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should the Law Protect Them from Harm, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 57, 57, 62 (2004)
(noting “very little oversight or regulation” of ART); Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due Process Right to
In Vitro Fertilization, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2792, 2794-95 (2005) [hereinafter Note] (describing regulation as limited).
However, the perception of ART as the “wild, wild West” of medicine may not match the reality. The
American Society of Reproductive Technology has issued a report asserting that ART is “already one of the most highly
regulated of all medical practices in the United States.” Oversight of Assisted Reproductive Tech., 12 ASRM BULLETINS,
no. 18, May 25, 2010. See also G. David Adamson, Does Self-Regulation Work for Implementation of Single Embryo
Transfer, in SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER 256 (Jan Gerris et al. eds., 2009) (describing ART in the U.S. as “very highly
regulated,” despite the perception of a lack of regulation).
15

George J. Annas, The Shadowlands-Secrets, Lies, and Assisted Reproduction, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED.
935, 937 (1998); Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 637-657 (1997); Lars
Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603,
648-59 (2003). See Rosato, supra note 14, at 57.
16

While constitutional law has protected women’s right to abortion since Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), even during the most expansive period for substantive due process, the Supreme Court did not guarantee that
everyone would have access to abortion through public funding. See Harris v. McRae 448 U.S. 297 (1980). For that
reason (and others), feminists have questioned whether the emphasis on securing “rights,” as opposed to access, was the
appropriate focus for advocates. See Sandra Berenknopf, Judicial and Congressional Back-Door Methods That Limit the
Effect of Roe v. Wade: There is No Choice If There Is No Access, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 653, 698 (1997) (“By using back-door
methods such as withholding Medicaid funding . . . Congress and the courts have consistently limited the force of Roe v.
Wade in the lives of poor women . . . . [I]f a woman does not have access to abortion, then she cannot choose to have an
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limits are constitutional, they can be justified as a matter of policy, and argues that these efforts
need to be understood in the larger context of the ongoing assault on women’s reproductive rights
and the sexist treatment of women as patients and mothers. While we might think that regulation
of ART is a gender-neutral construct, efforts to regulate ART in the wake of the Octomom case
have been anything but neutral and reveal much about how society and the law treats women and
mothers in particular. Finally, Part IV suggests that the existing system, which relies on physician
self-regulation, the physician’s duty to obtain informed consent, and patient and physician
education, while not a perfect solution, remains the preferred approach given existing political
and cultural circumstances.
I. WHY IS EVERYONE SO MAD ABOUT THE OCTOMOM AND WHAT CAN WE DO
ABOUT IT?
A. No Husband, No Job, No Sense
The firestorm of criticism directed at Suleman centered on several aspects of her
situation: the risk of harm to the children from such a high-order multiple birth;17 her seeming
inability to support the children;18 and her questionable mental state.19 At the most basic level,

abortion.”); April L. Cherry, Choosing Substantive Justice: A Discussion of “Choice,” “Rights,” and the New
Reproductive Technologies, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 431, 433 (1997) (“For example, most feminists have supported
abortion in the terms of choice and bodily integrity, viewing any restriction regarding pre-viability access to abortion as
working against the goal of equality for women.”); Linda C. Fentiman, Pursuing the Perfect Mother: Why America’s
Criminalization of Maternal Substance Abuse is Not the Answer – A Comparative Legal Analysis 15 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. 389, 456-457 (2009) (discussing the fragility of the constitutional right to abortion and abortion opponents’ “multiple
avenues to undercut women’s ability to control” reproductive rights and access to abortion); Courtney Miller, Reflections
on Protecting Conscience for Health Care Providers: A Call For More Inclusive Statutory Protection in Light of
Constitutional Considerations, 15 S.CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 327, 340 (2006) (discussing the conscience clause
movement in reaction to abortions rights groups’ drive to make abortion access a Constitutional right rather than being
merely permitted); Ronli Sifris, Restrictive Regulation of Abortion and the Right to Health 18 MED. L. REV. 185, 211-212
(2010) (arguing that restrictions on abortion violate the right to reproductive health; recognizing the connection between
the right to health and the need for access to abortion.). Likewise, while much of the scholarship and advocacy around
ART involves rights of those using the technology, the barriers to access to the technology present a pressing concern as
well. See Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J.
GENDER L. & JUST. 18 (2008);
17

Saul, supra note 14, at A1; Andrews Health Law Litigation Rep., California Medical Board Accuses
‘Octomom’ Doctor of Negligence, 17 No. 9 ANDREWS HEALTH L. LITIG. REP. no. 9, Jan. 7, 2010, at 3; Alissa Stockage,
Regulating Multiple Birth Pregnancies: Comparing the United Kingdom’s Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme with the
United State’s Progressive, Intimate Decision-Making Approach, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 559, 563-567 (2010).
18

NBC Today Show Profile: Latest Controversies with Octuplet Mom Nadya Suleman (NBC Television
Broadcast Feb. 9, 2009); Sabrina Ghebremedin & Kimberly Brown, ABC Nightline News: Octuplet Mom Nadya Suleman
Says She’s Struggling but Kids are Healthy, ABCNEWS.COM (July 13, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/octomomoctuplets-mother/story?id=11152828); TMZ Staff, Octomom Gets Reprieve From Foreclosure! TMZ ONLINE, Mar. 24,
2010, http://www.tmz.com/2010/03/24/octomom-nadya-suleman-foreclosure-house-la-habra-mortgage-kids/.
19

CNN: Showbiz Tonight, (CNN television broadcast Feb. 25, 2009), transcript available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0902/25/sbt.01.html; Raina Kelly, Octomom Hypocrisy: Four Reasons Nadya
Suleman Drives Us Crazy, and Why We’re Wrong, NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE, Mar. 3, 2009,
http://www.newsweek.com/2009/03/02/octomom-hypocrisy.html; Kimi Yoshino, Jessica Garrison & Andrew Blankstein
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many believe Suleman simply had way too many children. This criticism embodies two distinct
concerns: (1) she had too many children at one time, putting the children at great risk for health
problems and disabilities;20 and (2) she had too many children in total. Common sense counseled
that Suleman could not possibly care for that many children adequately, especially because she is
single. Typical comments included the following:
It seems Nadya Suleman failed to take the elementary precaution of having a
father around for her octuplets. Or any income to raise them. As if that wasn’t
irresponsible enough, the 33-year old already has six other children under the
age of seven, including two year old twins, courtesy of IVF and a sperm donor.
Sorry honey, that isn’t a family: it’s a train crash.21
To make matters worse, Suleman was unemployed and seemed unlikely to ever have the
ability to provide adequately for her fourteen children.22 Even Suleman’s mother openly
questioned her ability to support her children.23 In fact Suleman’s main source of income after the
octuplets’ birth came from a reality TV show, which some view as exploiting the children.24
Indeed, concern about her ability to support her children prompted a trial judge to appoint a
guardian to oversee their finances, although a California appellate court subsequently overturned
the appointment.25 Critics feared that for all of these reasons, the burden of caring for the
octuplets would fall on the state. To make matters worse, Suleman seemed mentally unstable, not
just to the public spectators, but to her own family. Her mother revealed that Suleman kept the
octuplet pregnancy a secret from her family by stating she had a tumor26 and her father admitted
that he “question[ed] her mental situation.”27

The Craze over Octomom Nadya Suleman, It’s All Just So Octo-licious, Nadya Suleman Can’t Seem to Get Enough Kids,
and Media Audiences Can’t Seem to Get Enough of Her, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2009, at 3.
20

Saul, supra note 14, at A1.

21

Allison Pearson, A miserable ‘miracle’, DAILY MAIL (last updated Feb. 17, 2009), at 15, available at
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1135370/ALLISON-PEARSON-The-day-nostalgia-fell-skies.html.
22

Latest Controversies with Octuplet Mom Nadya Suleman, supra note 18; Shaya Tayefe Mohajer, Octuplet
Mom Nadya Suleman On Food Stamps, Three Kids Receive Disability, HUFFINGTON POST (11:27 PM; Feb. 9, 2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/02/10/octuplet-mom-nadya-sulema_n_165508.html).
23

Latest Controversies with Octuplet Mom Nadya Suleman, supra note 18 (quoting Angela Suleman as
asking: “How are you going to provide for them? What are you thinking”); Katherine Thomson, Does Nadya Suleman
Think She’s Angelina Jolie?, HUFFINGTON POST (12:12 PM; Feb. 10, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/katherinethomson/does-nadya-suleman-think_b_165617.html.
24

NBC Today Show Profile: Guardian Appointed to Oversee Finances of Nadya Suleman’s Children, NBC
Broadcast (July 28, 2009); Johnny Dodd, Octuplets Mom Inks TV Deal and Has Book in the Works, PEOPLE MAGAZINE
ONLINE (May 31, 2009), http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20282320,00.html.
25

Suleman v. Super. Ct., 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); Court Rules in Favor of Octuplets’
Mother, supra note 11; Garcia, supra note 11.
26

Showbiz Tonight: Octu-mom’s Publicity Tour; Shocking Revelation from the Octu- Grandma; Inside the
Obama White House; Hottest Hollywood Men Over 40 (CNN television broadcast Feb. 25, 2009), transcript available at
http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0902/25/sbt.01.html.
27

Sarah Westcott, Octuplets Mum ‘Absolutely Irresponsible’ Says Her Dad, DAILY EXPRESS, Feb. 21,
2009, http://express.co.uk/posts/view/85752/Octuplets-mum-absolutely-irresponsible-says-her-dad.
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B. Legislatures Respond
In the wake of the octuplets’ birth, a number of legislators across the country introduced
legislation designed to prevent a similar ART debacle. These bills fell roughly into two
categories. Some contained resolutions calling for study of the possibility of state regulation or of
guidelines to be promulgated by medical professional societies.28 Other bills went further,
imposing specific limits on the number of embryos that could be transferred in a given IVF cycle.
Missouri H.B. 810 prohibited physicians from implanting more embryos than recommended by
ASRM. 29 Senate Bill 169, introduced in the Georgia legislature, provided specific proscriptions
regarding the permissible number of embryos for transfer: Women under age 40 could receive no
more than two embryos; women older than 40 were limited to 3 embryos, and women using
donated eggs or embryos were limited to two, regardless of the woman’s age.30
Ultimately, none of the bills introduced in the wake of the octuplets’ birth became law.31
Nonetheless, proposals to limit the number of embryos transferred through legislation continue to
receive support in the literature32 and the popular press,33 are already the norm in other
countries,34 and we likely have not seen the last of them here.
The other areas of concern—Suleman’s utilization of ART when she already had six
28

H. Res. 107, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); H. Con. Res. 130, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009);
Leg. Res. 236, 101st Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2009).
29

H. B. 810, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009).

30

S. B. 169, Gen. Assem. (Ga. 2009). The provision in question (Provision 19-7-67) was included in the
bill as first introduced. See http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2009_10/versions/sb169_As_introduced_LC_37_0857_2.htm.
31

H. Res. 107, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009) Measure History available at http://www.capitol.
hawaii.gov/session2009/lists/measure_indiv.aspx?billtype=HR&billnumber=107 (last visited July 17, 2010) (showing that
the bill was referred to committee in April of 2009 and nothing has happened to the bill since); H. Con. Res. 130, 25th
Leg.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Haw.
2009)
Measure
History,
available
at
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov
/session2009/lists/measure_indiv.aspx?billtype=HR&billnumber=130 (accessed July 17, 2010) (showing that the bill was
referred to WLO in March of 2009 and nothing has happened to the bill since); H. B. 810, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2009) Bill Summary, available at http://www.house.mo.gov/content.aspx?info=/bills091/bills/hb810.htm
(accessed July 17, 2010) (showing that no hearings are scheduled and the bill is currently on a calendar i.e. it is effectively
dead); Legis. Res. 236, 101st Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2009) History, available at http://nebraskalegislature.gov
/bills/view_bill.php?DocumentID=9135 (accessed July 17, 2010) (showing that the bill was referred to Judiciary
Committee on May 21, 2009 and nothing has happened to the bill since); S. B. 169, Gen. Assem. (Ga. 2009) Status
History available at http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2009_10/sum/sb169.htm (accessed July 17, 2010) (showing that the
bill was sent to House Second Readers in March of 2009 and nothing has happened to the bill since).
32

NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE BABIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS REGULATION 196 (2009);
Rosato, supra note 14, at 85; Siddharth Khanijou, Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction in Assisted Reproductive Technologies:
A License To Kill? 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 403, 423 (2005); Urska Velikonja, Comment, The Costs of Multiple
Gestation Pregnancies in Assisted Reproduction, 32 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 463 (2009).
33

See, e.g., LIZA MUNDY, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE 333 (2007) (arguing for federal limits on number of
embryos transferred) [hereinafter Mundy, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE].
34

Jan Gerris & Petra De Sutter, Single Embryo Transfer: Concepts and Definitions, in SINGLE EMBRYO
TRANSFER 58 (Jan Gerris et al. eds., 2009) (describing Belgian restrictions based on age, regardless of funding method);
Stephanie N. Sivinski, Putting Too Many (Fertilized) Eggs In One Basket: Methods of Reducing Multifetal Pregnancies in
the United States, 88 TEX. L. REV. 897, 906-07 (2010) (describing, inter alia, Great Britain’s Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority (HFEA) which has capped the number of embryos at two and Sweden’s legislation to make the
transfer of a single embryo the norm for almost all IVF procedures).
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children, especially in light of her marital and employment status and her mental state—did not
provoke legislation but certainly contributed to the public outcry.35 Some suggested that
physicians, if not the state, should refuse treatment to women who already have children (or at
least an excessive number of children).36 For example, California State Senator Am Aanestad, a
Republican, spoke out against establishing governmental standards for medical care—unless
“taxpayer dollars” were spent for care of the children—”not just the eight now, but the previous
six, over the course of their lifetime.”37 Others called for mandatory psychological screening of
prospective patients..38 In fact, the California Medical Board cited Dr. Kamrava’s failure to refer
Suleman for a mental health evaluation and to consider potential harm to her living children and
any future offspring as evidence of gross negligence.39 Recently introduced legislation also seems
to be opening the door to mandatory mental health screening when assisted reproductive
technology agencies are involved.40
I have serious concerns about whether any of these restrictions are permissible or
advisable. However, this Article will focus on the proposed limits on the number of embryos
transferred, though the concerns that have animated the other two—what we might call
irresponsible procreation or questionable parenting—will inform our understanding of the motives
driving the first set of proposals. I turn now to an analysis of the constitutional implications of
embryo transfer limits.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
A. Fundamental Rights At Stake
Restrictions on access to and the practice of ART arguably raise due process
constitutional concerns. Cases involving procreation, parenting, and medical care all potentially
35

Jessica Garrison et al., Octuplets’ Birth Spawns Outrage From Public, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/07/local/me-octuplets7.
36

Tracee Cornforth, “Octo-Mom’s Fertiliyt Doctor Implants at Least 7 Embryos in 49-Year-Old Woman,”
ABOUT.COM (Feb. 13, 2009), http://womenshealth.about.com/b/2009/02/13/octo-moms-fertility-doctor-implants-at-least7-embryos-in-49-year-old-woman.htm.
37

Alison Stateman, The Octuplets Mom Speaks, and the Questions Grow, TIME.COM, Feb. 7, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1877962,00.html. See also H.Con. Res. No. 107, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Haw. 2009) (specifically addressing concerns generated by Suleman; “Whereas, there has been public outcry and concern
over the ethics of implanting numerous embryos in patients that may not have the resources to care for the children that
result from the fertility treatment.”).
38

S. B. 509, 3d Leg., 2010 Sess. (Kan. 2009) (requiring reporting of information regarding fertility
treatment to the state, including “the method of psychological screening used to evaluate prospective patients and
donors.”).
39

Kim Yoshino, California Board Accuses Octuplets Doctor of Negligence, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2010,
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-octuplets5-2010jan05,0,97780.story. In a separate complaint, the California
Medical Board cited Dr. Kamrava for failing to refer another patient with a quadruplet pregnancy or her husband or adult
children for a “mental health evaluation to determine her willingness to undergo multi-fetal reduction.” Tony Barboza,
Medical Board Targets Doctor, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2010, at AA1. However, the Administrative Law Judge hearing the
disciplinary charges against Kamrava found that failure to refer Suleman and the other patient for mental health evaluation
did not constitute negliglence. Kamrava, Proposed Decision, supra note 9, at 33, ¶ ¶18-19, 35, ¶ ¶34-35.
40

S. B. 2240, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010). The bill died in committee on judiciary on Apr. 30, 2010.
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impact the assessment of the constitutionality of embryo transfer limits. I will address each in
turn.
1.

The Right to Procreate

The Supreme Court has long recognized the right to procreate as fundamental. But what
does it mean to identify a “right to procreate”? In fact, Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area
has two facets: the Constitution limits the state’s ability to hinder procreation and its ability to
compel procreation. These dual aspects of the right to procreate find expression in the first
instance in the sterilization cases and in the second in the abortion and contraception cases. The
sterilization cases seem most analogous to restrictions on ART, so I begin there.
Any discussion of the constitutionality of sterilization in the United States of course
starts with Buck v. Bell, the case in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously declared
“three generations of imbeciles are enough.”41 Carrie Buck, like her mother, was institutionalized
in a Virginia mental hospital ostensibly because of feeble-mindedness.42 Consequently, the
hospital sought to sterilize her under a Virginia statute allowing for sterilization of individuals
suffering from inheritable conditions. The Court upheld the statute, and the sterilization of Carrie
Buck, on an open eugenics rationale, reasoning that “[i]t is better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility,
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.”43
Fifteen years later, the Court had another occasion to consider the states’ ability to
sterilize an individual without his or her consent in Skinner v. Oklahoma.44 In Skinner, the Court
struck down an Oklahoma statute that provided for sterilization of habitual criminals. In doing so,
the Court recognized that procreation is “fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race.”45 However, the Court decided the case on equal protection grounds and refrained from
explicitly overruling Buck. Indeed, although many have decried the Buck Court’s sanction of
eugenics as a desirable rationale for sterilization,46 and although the Skinner Court acknowledged
the danger of discriminatory policies and genocide, some commentators have suggested that the
Supreme Court today would likely reaffirm the central principle of Buck—that the state can
prohibit individuals from procreating—at least in certain ways.47 In fact, laws permitting
41
42
43
44
45

Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
Id. at 205.
Id. at 207.
316 U.S. 535, 536-37 (1942).
Id. at 541.

46

PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES 277-78 (2008); Michelle Oberman, Thirteen
Ways of Looking at Buck v. Bell: Thoughts Occasioned by Paul Lombardo’s Three Generations, No Imbeciles 59 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 357, 361-65 (2010).
47

See MICHELLE N. MEYER, NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INSTITUTE OF GOV., STATES’ REGULATION OF
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: WHAT DOES THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ALLOW? (July 2009), available at
http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/health_care/2009-07-States_Regulation_ART.pdf; Lombardo, supra note 46, at 271; Erika T.
Blum, When Terminating Parental Rights is Not Enough: A New Look At Compulsory Sterilization 28 GA. L. REV. 977,
999-1004 (1994); In re Conservatorship of Angela D., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (1999) (upholding conservators’ rights to
sterilize a mentally handicapped conservatee, noting the danger of rape and questionable ability to consent in mentally
handicapped); CAL. PROB. CODE. § 1959 (describing the vulnerability of developmentally disabled persons to unlawful
sexual conduct).
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sterilization without the subjects’ consent currently continue to operate, though on a substantially
smaller scale and different basis then in the heyday of eugenics.48
Hence, it is clear that the right to procreate derived from the sterilization cases has never
been absolute. Moreover, the question remains whether the right to procreate encompasses the
right to procreate by means of assisted reproduction. Scholars have vigorously debated the
point.49 Some would argue that we cannot equate the right to be free from forced sterilization
with the right to access reproductive technology.50 They would posit that coerced sterilization
involves a physical invasion of the person that poses risks to the person’s health and requires
affirmative acts that take away a capability the person already has.51 Limiting access to ART, by
contrast, implicates neither of these concerns. The government would not be forcing any physical
intrusion, and the restriction would arguably not constitute an act, since it would not disturb the
procreative status quo of the individual. Under this view, the right to procreate rests on a right of
privacy grounded in the protection of bodily integrity, and thus would not extend to ART.52
However, to accept this argument is to ignore Skinner’s recognition of the right to
procreate as fundamental. Numerous cases have since cited it for that proposition.53 Surely the
Court’s frequent acknowledgment of a “right to procreate” means more than a right to be free
from unwanted medical procedures or treatment or to be left alone to one’s own ability to
procreate. Nor should it turn on a false act/omission dichotomy.54 Indeed our understanding of
the nature of the right to procreate needs to adjust to the changed circumstances of procreation in
the 21st century. The reconceptualization of the fundamental right to marry to encompass samesex marriage provides an instructive example of this process. For example, in interpreting its
state constitutional privacy provision, the California Supreme Court viewed the fundamental right
to marry not in structural terms, that is, as protection for a defined entity of a man and a woman
with a singular purpose of procreation. Rather, it viewed the right in terms of the values
underlying it—the significance of marriage to the happiness and fulfillment of the individuals
involved. 55 Thus the right to marry deserved special protection because of its integral role in
48

Lombardo, supra note 46, at 267-68; See e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5701; Cf. Wirsing v. Mich.
Protection and Advocacy Serv. (In re Wirsing), 573 N.W.2d 51, 55 (Mich. 1998) (allowing sterilization of incompetent
woman on evidence of her best interests, but declining to apply a “clear and convincing evidence” standard); Estate of
C.W., 640 A.2d 427, 428 (Pa.Super.1994) (applying a “clear and convincing evidence” standard for evaluating whether
sterilization was in the patient’s best interest).
49

John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 439 (2003); Rao,
supra note 14, at 1459-67 (2008); Sonia M. Suter, The “Repugnance” Lens of Gonzalez v. Carhart and Other Theories of
Reproductive Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1514, 1517-19 (2008)
[hereinafter Suter, Repugnance]; Rosato, supra note 14, at 95-98.
50
51
52

Rao, supra note 14, at 1461.
Id. at 1465.
Suter, Repugnance, supra note 49, at 1518; Rosato, supra note 14, at 96.

53

See e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,720 (1997); Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d
760, 772 (Cal. 1985); Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1402 (Mo. 1990); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992); Thornburgh v. Amer. College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 773 (1986); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 34 (1973); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
54

See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 34 (1988)
(critiquing notion of legally relevant distinctions between acts and omissions).
55

See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 425 (Cal. 2008) (quoting Bruce C. Hafen, The
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personal autonomy and liberty of the individual. Likewise, we could deepen our understanding of
the right to procreate consistent with the possibilities assisted reproductive technology now offers
us. If so, we can more easily make the case that the right to procreate is broad enough to
encompass the right to access reproductive technology necessary to enable the infertile to
procreate.56
A look at the flip side of the right to procreate—the right not to procreate can provide
support for this point. Consider the contraception cases. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the
Supreme Court struck down a law prohibiting the use of contraception, finding that the law
infringed the married couple’s right of privacy under the due process clause.57 A few years later,
the Court considered another challenge to a contraceptive ban in Eisenstadt v. Baird.58 In
Eisenstadt, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts law banning the sale of contraceptives to
unmarried persons. 59 In doing so, the Court made clear that the right of privacy encompassed the
right of individuals, not just married couples, “to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child (emphasis added).”60
The contraception cases thus advance the case for constitutional protection of ART in
three ways. First, Eisenstadt establishes that the constitutional right to privacy protects the
decision whether to procreate; the right does not merely protect against unwarranted physical
intrusions on one’s person, as we might have extrapolated from the sterilization cases.61 Second,
the right applies to individuals, regardless of marital status. Third, and quite significantly, the
right protects access to the means of achieving the desired result—avoiding procreation through

Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy; Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH.
L. REV. 463, 482 (1983)) (“In light of the fundamental nature of the substantive rights embodied in the right to marry –
and their central importance to an individual’s opportunity to live a happy, meaningful, and satisfying life as a full member
of society . . . .”).
56

There are additional layers of complexity to this issue that are not raised by proposed restrictions on
embryo transfers. Some would argue that use of certain technologies does not fall within the rubric of procreation. For
example, preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) enables individuals to control the characteristics of their children, an
opportunity not enjoyed by individuals who procreate naturally, so that procedure might not justify constitutional
protection based on the right to procreate. Meyer, supra note 47, at 9-10. For a fuller analysis of this argument, see
Robertson, supra note 49. IVF and embryo transfer, by contrast, truly operate as substitutes for procreation by natural
means; instead of joining egg and sperm coitally, egg and sperm are joined in the lab and resulting embryos transferred to
the uterus. Of course, some might claim that the right to procreate means solely the right to genetically reproduce, which
would take IVF using donor gametes outside the ambit of the right to procreate. Others might respond that the right to
procreate should encompass the right to assume parental status through creation of a child. The embryo transfer limits
discussed here, though, would apply to all users. Moreover, although Nadya Suleman used sperm from a known donor,
she could have inseminated herself or engaged in coital reproduction if she did not suffer from infertility. Hence, we need
not determine here if all assisted reproduction falls within the category of procreation to assess the constitutionality of
embryo transfer restrictions.
57
58
59

381 U.S. 479 (1965).
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Id. at 454-55.

60

Id. at 453. See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l., 431 U.S. 678, 686-88 (1977) (discussing the
privacy rights established in Eisenstadt regarding contraceptives).
61

But see Suter, Repugnance supra note 49, at 1544-45 (positing that contraception cases protect bodily
integrity by allowing individuals to prevent unwanted physical burdens).
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technology, however rudimentary; the right does not simply prohibit the government from taking
away some freedom or capability the person already possesses. I would argue that the right of
individuals to access ART for the purposes of procreating is no different than the right of
individuals to access a condom, diaphragm, or other method of birth control for the purpose of
avoiding procreation.
A federal district court agreed with the analogy. In Lifchez v. Hartigan,62 the court
considered a challenge to an abortion statute that contained a provision prohibiting
experimentation on a fetus. The court ruled that the provision violated a woman’s fundamental
right of privacy because it could be interpreted to prohibit procedures related to the decision
whether to bear or beget a child, such as embryo transfer and chorionic villi sampling. In the
court’s view, these procedures fell squarely within the woman’s zone of privacy:
Embryo transfer is a procedure designed to enable an infertile woman to bear
her own child. It takes no great leap of logic to see that within the cluster of
constitutionally protected choices that includes the right to have access to
contraceptives, there must be included within that cluster the right to submit to a
medical procedure that may bring about, rather than prevent, pregnancy.63
Moreover, in the ART context, a federal district court has held that the constitutional
right to privacy encompasses a woman’s right to become pregnant by artificial insemination.64
Considering the Supreme Court cases “holistically,” the court concluded that, “A woman has a
constitutional privacy right to control her reproductive functions.” 65
The notion that the fundamental right to privacy encompasses reproductive choice has
been recognized in both Supreme Court and lower court opinions outside of the contraception and
ART contexts as well. In upholding a woman’s right to abortion, the Court in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, wrote that:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. . . . These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
62

735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990).

63

See also Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 728
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (deciding whether to have children establishes “right of access”); J.R. v.
Utah, 261 F. Supp.2d 1268, 1279 (D. Utah 2002) (observing that statute at issue did not prohibit gestational surrogacy or
deny access to that medical technology, so plaintiffs had “effectively exercised their right to procreate,” though statute did
unduly burden that right by declaring surrogate legal parent). But see Robertson, supra note 49, at 454 (expressing doubt
that conservative Supreme Court would find “most specific uses of assisted reproduction . . . constitutionally protected”
but predicting that Court would grant protection to some technologies). Cf. Abigail Alliance, 495 F. 3d at 711 n.19
(distinguishing “protecting individual freedom from life-saving, but forced, medical treatment” from “providing
affirmative access to a potentially harmful, and even fatal, commercial good”).
64
65

Cameron v. Bd. of Educ., 795 F. Supp. 228, 236-37 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
Id. at 237.
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matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.66
Casey thus reaffirms the vitality of the Griswold protection of decision-making liberty,
as well as the liberty interest in autonomy and bodily integrity that protects individuals from
government coerced medical treatment recognized in cases like Cruzan.67 Casey thus supports
the claim that ART and IVF, in particular, fall within the fundamental right to procreate.
2.

Familial Privacy and Parental Rights

Embryo transfer restrictions also could run afoul of the constitutional protection afforded
to decision-making about important family matters. Beyond any concerns about infringing
women’s right to procreate, legislative limits on the number of embryos transferred undercuts
women’s parental authority. The right to control the upbringing of one’s children is a
constitutional right enjoyed by parents.68 Recognition of this right by the Supreme Court in fact
predates the procreation cases.69 While the Supreme Court cases that have addressed the
fundamental rights of parents have focused on education, custody, and visitation,70 in Parham v.
J.R., the Court addressed a procedural due process challenge to procedures for commitment of
minors.71 The Court stated that “our precedents permit the parents to retain a substantial, if not
the dominant, role in the decision [to voluntarily commit a minor for psychiatric treatment],
absent a finding of neglect or abuse.”72 Likewise, other cases have recognized a constitutional
right for parents to make decisions regarding medical care for their children.73
Embryo transfer limits and ART restrictions do not directly implicate the constitutional
right to parent, however, because the woman undergoing IVF is making a decision about her own
medical care, not the child’s. At the time of the decision, there is no child, there are only potential
children. Moreover, defining it as a parental right runs the risk of elevating the status of the
embryos to that of children.74 Thus, the constitutional right to parent does not present the
66
67
68

Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851.
Id. at 2810.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

69

Pierce, 268 U.S. 510; Meyer, 262 U.S. 390; Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“[T]he interest
of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children – is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court.”)
70

Pierce, 268 U.S. 510 (education); Meyer, 262 U.S. 390 (education); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972) (custody); Troxel, 530 U.S. 57 (visitation). Cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979) (voluntary psychiatric
commitment).
71

Parham, 442 U.S. at 604.

72

Id. The Court earlier stated that parents generally the right and a “high duty” to seek medical care for
their children. Id. at 602.
73

See, e.g., Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The right to family association
includes the right of parents to make important medical decisions for their children, and of children to have those decisions
made by their parents rather than the state.”); Matter of Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1013-14 (1979).
74

On the danger of according fetuses legal rights, see Lisa McLennan Brown, Feminist Theory and the
Erosion of Women’s Reproductive Rights: The Implications of Fetal Personhood Laws and In Vitro Fertilization, 13 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 87 (2005); Joyce E. McConnell, Relational and Liberal Feminism: the ‘Ethic of Care,’
Fetal Personhood and Autonomy, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 291 (1996). This concern might be ameliorated by viewing the right
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strongest basis for challenging embryo transfer limits. I will argue, though, that the law’s
treatment of parental decision-making provides a useful frame of reference for evaluating the
wisdom of the policy at issue here.75
3.

The Right to Autonomy in Medical Decision-Making

In Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, the Supreme Court acknowledged a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment, and assumed
that this right encompassed refusal of life-saving nutrition and hydration. 76 Cruzan could have
stood for broader recognition of a fundamental right to make decisions regarding one’s health
care, but a subsequent decision related to medical care in the right-to-die context rejected that
interpretation. In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court upheld a Washington law that
criminalized assisted suicide. 77 The Court insisted on a “careful description” of the asserted
fundamental right—to avoid expanding the category of fundamental rights—and thus found that
there was no such right to assisted suicide.78 The Court wrote, “That many of the rights and
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the
sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so
protected.79
If we apply Glucksberg’s “careful description” methodology to the embryo transfer
limits, we may have difficulty showing IVF is “deeply rooted in our history and traditions, or so
fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty, that [it] is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.80 Glucksberg makes a potential constitutional challenge to the embryo
transfer limits based on a fundamental right to medical autonomy unlikely. Obviously, we cannot
claim any deeply rooted tradition regarding IVF specifically, since it is technology created within
the last thirty years.81 Unlike the case of assisted suicide, however, there has been no historical
prohibition of ART or IVF. However, lack of consistent regulation alone might not suffice to
distinguish IVF. In Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach,
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. circuit applied the Glucksberg analysis in considering a
challenge to FDA restrictions on access to experimental drugs that passed phase I clinical testing
by terminally ill patients.82 The court defined it as a right to access experimental drugs, and then

as one of family, rather than parental, decision-making. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard,
and the Evisceration of Women’s Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 305 (2010) (arguing Court has
acknowledged importance of privacy in decisions regarding family and intimate relationships and “protected space for
family decision-making”).
75
76
77
78
79
80

See infra at n. 237-39 and accompanying text.
497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
521 U.S. 702, 735-36 (1997).
Id. at 721.
Id. at 727.
Id.

81

The first so-called “test-tube baby” was Louise Brown, born on July 25, 1978. See Medicine: Test-Tube
Baby: It’s a Girl, TIME MAGAZINE ONLINE (Aug. 7, 1978), http://www.time.com/time/magazine
/article/0,9171,948239,00.html.
82

Abigail Alliance, 795 F.3d 695, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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held that the right was not “deeply rooted” in the nation’s history and traditions.83 The court
rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the regulation was deeply rooted because the government did not
regulate drugs for efficacy until 1962. In the court’s view, lack of prior government regulation
“standing alone,” was insufficient to establish a right as a deeply rooted tradition.84 The court
also cited several cases finding no constitutional right to a specific kind of treatment or to medical
care without any government interference.85
However, unlike the rights claimed in Abigail Alliance or Glucksberg (as narrowly
defined by those courts), the right at stake here links directly to rights that have received
protection. We might make a case that fertility treatment has long been recognized as a private
matter between doctor and patient, looping back to the procreation, abortion and contraception
cases. As such, fertility treatment may be considered essential to “ordered liberty.” We might
also fight against the hyper-specific articulation of the claimed right and seek a broader
understanding of tradition.86 Nonetheless, basing a constitutional challenge to embryo transfer
restrictions solely on a constitutional right to medical autonomy would likely prove unsuccessful.
As with a claim based on fundamental parental rights, though, long-standing common law
doctrine surrounding medical treatment will play a key role in our policy analysis.87
Admittedly the constitutional right to parent is not directly on point, and the Court has
refrained from characterizing the right to medical autonomy as fundamental. Nonetheless, as
discussed above, the well-established fundamental right to procreate should be broad enough to
encompass a right to access necessary fertility treatments like IVF. Thus I would argue in favor
of a theory of procreative liberty that protects choices surrounding reproduction, is grounded
essentially in protection of autonomy and self-determination, and is bolstered by constitutional
solicitude for medical and parental decision-making.88
4. Standard of Review: Strict Scrutiny or Undue Burden?
Of course, even if the right to procreate is fundamental and subsumes the right to ART or
IVF, these precedents merely establish protection from unwarranted government intrusion into
the procreative decision. The question is whether the state has sufficient reason and appropriate
83

Id. at 703. A dissenting opinion took issue with the majority’s narrow characterization of the right,
asserting the “claimed fundamental right is to attempt to preserve one’s life.” Id. at 716 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
84
85
86
87

Id. at 707.
Id. at 710 & n.18.
Suter, Repugnance, supra note 49, at 1542-43.
See infra nn. 69 and 239 and accompanying text.

88

Competing theories regarding the constitutional right to procreate and ART abound. I do not intend a
thorough assessment of all such theories here. Suffice to say, that a good case can be made that the right to procreate in its
most basic sense—creating a genetically related child, as discussed supra note 56, could be justified based on many of the
theories proffered. Sonia Suter, for example, would find a right to IVF potentially supported by theories based on
procreative liberty and autonomy, equality and family privacy. Suter, Repugnance, supra note 49, at 1524-25, 1550, 1561.
Although a theory based on “history and tradition,” would make recognition difficult, Suter argues that even that theory
might not foreclose the inclusion of IVF in a right to procreate, though a theory grounded in the protection of bodily
integrity would. Id. at 1543, 1546. See also Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive
Technology, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1083, 1123 (1998) (defining the right to privacy as a “relational right” and arguing
that a married couple’s right to reproduce via IVF is protected under that right). Sonia Suter, for example, would find a
right to IVF potentially supported by theories based on procreative liberty and autonomy, equality and family privacy.
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methods for restricting access to ART or prohibiting certain procedures. Typically, restrictions on
fundamental rights have been subject to strict scrutiny—requiring the state to provide a
compelling reason for the infringement and to demonstrate that the means used by the statute to
achieve its purpose were closely related or narrowly tailored to that end.89 However, the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence in this area has at times deviated from this analytical framework. The most
recent cases implicating procreation-related rights are the abortion cases, and in these, the Court
has enunciated a different standard of analysis.90
Roe v. Wade, the case that first acknowledged abortion as within the fundamental right of
procreative privacy, did apply the standard “strict scrutiny” analysis, and, in doing so, developed
the well-known trimester framework for balancing the rights of the woman against the state’s
interest in protection of potential life, the latter becoming compelling and sufficient to ban
abortion once the fetus has reached the point of viability, roughly during the third trimester of
pregnancy.91 However, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court retreated from this approach
and adopted a new standard—the undue burden standard.92 Under this standard, a state regulation
of abortion violates due process only if it “has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.”93
Assuming that proposed embryo transfer limits would infringe on a fundamental right, it
is not entirely clear whether a court would analyze a constitutional challenge to ART restrictions
using the more traditional “strict scrutiny” typically applied to sterilization questions, or whether
the “undue burden” standard now operative in the abortion context would control.94 In fact, the
one federal case to consider a constitutional challenge to an ART-related statute applied both
standards. In J.R. v. State of Utah,95 a married couple that had entered into a gestational
surrogacy contract challenged the refusal of the Office of Vital Records to list them as mother and
father on the birth certificate. The Office had relied on a Utah statute declaring surrogacy
contracts unenforceable and declaring the surrogate the mother for all legal purposes.96 The court
ultimately concluded that the law violated the intended genetic parents’ right to procreate under
both a strict scrutiny and undue burden analysis, so I will likewise analyze the proposed embryo
transfer restrictions under both approaches.

89

See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386, 388, 390-91 (1978) (holding that requiring certain
individuals to obtain a court order grating permission to marry does not meet strict scrutiny); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 11-12 (1967) (holding that the statutory scheme adopted by the state of Virginia to prevent marriages between persons
based on racial classification does not survive strict scrutiny).
90
91
92
93
94

Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 874-76 (1992).
Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65 (1973).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id. at 877-78.
Rosato, supra note 14, at 98. Cf. Note, supra note 14 (arguing that court would apply intermediate

scrutiny).
95
96

J.R. v. Utah, F.Supp.2d 1268, 1279 (D. Utah 2002).
Id.
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B. Analyzing the Embryo Transfer Limits
1. Strict Scrutiny
If we analyze the proposed restrictions under strict scrutiny, the state must establish a
compelling interest in minimizing the number of higher order multiple births. The state would
undoubtedly argue that it has a compelling interest in ensuring the welfare of mothers, of children
and, of potential life as well. There is no doubt that the more embryos transferred, the greater the
chance of multiple births and thus the greater the risk of adverse outcomes for the mother and any
resulting children.97 Common potentially serious complications of multiple order pregnancies for
the mother include preterm labor and delivery, gestational diabetes and pre-eclampsia, and, for the
children, increased morbidity and mortality, as well as higher incidences of cerebral palsy,98
blindness,99 and chronic respiratory problems100 resulting primarily from the preterm birth.101
Multiple births can also lead to increased maternal depression and anxiety.102
While the importance of these state goals would seem unassailable, the evaluation of the
sufficiency of the state’s interests is a bit more complicated than might appear at first glance,
particularly if the legislation aims primarily to protect future children conceived and born through
IVF. As far back as Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court has recognized that the state has at least a
legitimate interest in protecting potential life.103 Although under Roe, that interest did not rise to
the level of “compelling” until the fetus had reached the point of viability,104 in Casey, the Court
declared that the state had a compelling interest in potential life that it could promote throughout
the pregnancy.105 These cases thus support the state’s interest in protecting potential life.
However, the state’s interest in potential life in the abortion cases protects beings already
conceived and developing in the womb. A question still remains whether the state has a
compelling interest in the protection of potential lives at the embryo stage.106 In Davis v. Davis,
97

The Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reproductive Med., Multiple Pregnancy Associated with
Infertility Therapy, FERTILITY & STERILITY, Vol. 86, Suppl. 4 (Nov. 2006), available at
http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/Practice_Guidelines/Educational_Bulletins/
multiple_pregnancy_associated(1).pdf (last accessed Apr. 24, 2010).
98

Cerebral palsy is a disorder that affects the “brain and nervous system functions such as movement,
learning, hearing, seeing, and thinking.” Cerebral Palsy, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000716.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2010).
99

Retinopathy of prematurity is abnormal blood vessel development in the eye, which can occur in a
premature infant.
Retinopathy of Prematurity, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001618.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2010).
100

Bronchopulmonary dysplasia is a chronic lung condition that can affect newborn babies born
prematurely.
Bronchopulmonary Dysplasia, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001088.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2010).
101
102

Multiple Pregnancy Associated with Infertility Therapy, supra note 97.
Id.

103

Roe, 410 U.S. at 150. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 837; Carey v. Population Services,
Int’l., 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 299, 313 (1980); City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 466 (1983) (citing Harris v. McRae).
104
105
106

Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 876.
Cf. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:123-9:133 (West 2000) (declaring embryos to be “persons” as a matter of state
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the Tennessee Supreme Court found no such interest, but Davis was relying on Roe v. Wade,
which found the state’s interest in potential life compelling only at the point of viability.107 It may
be that after Casey, the state’s interest in potential life could precede initiation of the pregnancy,
but the question generates complications of logic and philosophy. If we recognize a state’s
general and undifferentiated “interest in potential life,” even prior to implantation, analogous to
the one put forth in the abortion context, we open the door to state efforts requiring donation or
implantation of embryos, regardless of the parents’ wishes.108 Recognizing such a sweeping state
interest brings to mind Orwellian science fiction and would pose a grave threat to individual and
parental autonomy.
Yet to deny any possibility of state interest also seems wrong. Surely the state has an
interest in maximizing the chance that embryos that parents choose to implant will develop into
healthy children. However there is an irony and an ontological paradox here. For those who
would promote the broader state view—an undifferentiated interest in protecting preimplantation
life—desirable policy might require transfer of many embryos, in direct contravention of the
embryo transfer restriction, and thereby increase the risk of harm to any resulting children.109 By
contrast, those who argue for a narrower state interest—preventing harm to future children—
would actually be promoting the destruction of some embryos to increase the chance for others to
thrive. Thus the state’s claim of a compelling interest in preventing harm to future children from
multiple births might result in them not being born at all.110 Admittedly, it might be possible, in
some instances, to cryopreserve the non-transferred embryos, which would give them a chance to
develop in a later cycle or through donation. But that possibility rests on numerous assumptions
that are unlikely to prove valid in many cases, including that the embryos could be cyopreserved,
that the creators would undergo another IVF cycle, or that they would agree to donate any unused
embryos to someone else for implantation.
Feminists also face something of a dilemma on this point. Whenever we acknowledge a
state interest in protecting potential life—whether fetal or embryonic—we run the risk of inviting
state restrictions on women’s reproductive freedom.111 On the other hand, as mothers, feminists
also see the value and need for protection of women (and their children) from exploitive forces.112
We can reconcile these seemingly conflicting goals by distinguishing between harms done by
policy).
107

842 S.W. 2d 588, 602 (Tenn. 1992).

108

The future may be now in this regard. See infra at nn. 30, 155 and accompanying text (discussing S.B.
169, Gen. Assem. (Ga. 2009)). See also Suter, Repugnance, supra note 49, at 1527 (questioning whether bans on embryo
destruction or compelled embryo donation would implicate constitutional right to procreate). Colorado voters faced
Amendment 62, which would have defined person as “every human being from the beginning of biological development
of that human being,” in the Fall 2010 election. COLORADO GEN. ASSEM., 2010 BALLOT INFO. BOOKLET, RESEARCH PUB.
NO. 599-1 16-17 (2010).
109

This paradoxical position appears in reverse where anti-abortion proponents would prohibit termination
of pregnancies when the child will suffer severe genetic or congenital defects.
110

See M.A. Roberts, Independent Article, Supernumerary Pregnancy, Collective Harm and Two Forms of
the Nonidentity Problem, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 776 (2006) (detailing the legal and philosophical analysis of whether
children born in this situation can be considered harmed).
111

See Brown, supra note 74, at 103-04; Joyce E. McConnell, Relational and Liberal Feminism: The
“Ethic of Care,” Fetal Personhood and Autonomy, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 291, 306-07 (1996).
112

Marjorie M. Schultz, Abortion and Maternal-Fetal Conflict: Broadening Our Concerns, 1 S. CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 79, 81-82 (1992).
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third parties to the children and to women’s interests as mothers,113 from actions undertaken by
the mother in the exercise of her reproductive freedom, which may negatively impact her future
offspring.114 Protecting women as prospective mothers from harm caused by others differs from
state interventions that pit prospective mothers against their future children.115
Despite the philosophical, logical, and political conundrum presented, I believe courts
would ultimately accept without too much difficulty that the state has an interest, maybe even
compelling one, in trying to prevent creation of children with significant health problems of
disabilities.116 In fact, the interest may even be stronger than the state’s interest in promoting
potential life in the abortion context, given that these potential lives must be affirmatively created
and their protection would not impose physical burdens on the mother. In addition, the state
undeniably has a strong interest in protecting women’s health,117 as well as in regulating the
medical profession and in protecting its ethics and integrity.118
The constitutionality of proposed embryo transfer restrictions ultimately will turn then,
under strict scrutiny, on whether the statutory limits are narrowly tailored to achieve those
purposes. The ASRM has promulgated practice guidelines119 to reduce the risk of multiple births,
which under the Missouri bill,120 would presumably have taken on the force of law. However,
these guidelines, revised since the octuplets’ birth, do not support a bright line rule regarding
embryo transfer, as the Georgia bill sets forth, and certainly not one that would limit transfer to 1
or 2 embryos. The ASRM recommends a sliding scale based on age of the mother (or egg
provider). For example, a woman under age 35 would be limited to 2 embryos transferred, while
a woman age 38 could receive as many as 4, depending on certain parameters.121 Moreover, the
Guidelines expressly instruct physicians to take into account individual circumstances and allow
for upward adjustment for women under certain circumstances, such as two previous failed IVF

113

See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (recognizing a prenatal tort cause of action
for children later born alive).
114

See, e.g., Carolyn B. Ramsey, Restructuring The Debate Over Fetal Homicide Laws, 67 OHIO ST. L.J.
721, 744 (2006) (distinguishing termination of pregnancy by abortion from termination by “third party killers” addressed
in fetal homicide statutes).
115

See generally Reva Siegel, Reasoning From The Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992).
116

See Garrison, infra note 208, at 1640 (arguing that once embryo has been “selected for birth, “ state has
interest in protecting future child against health risks “comparable to those that the state offers to current children” because
burden of harm, vulnerability and inability to consent apply equally for prebirth children); Noah, supra note 15, at 661-63
(analogizing to accepted FDA regulation of severely teratogenic agents, such as DES); Rao, supra note 14, at 1479
(supporting ban on cloning to further state interest in advancing welfare of children); Note, supra note 14, at 2810
(predicting that reasonable regulations of IVF aimed at protecting mothers and children would be upheld).
117

Cf. Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 116 (recognizing state’s interest in protecting woman’s health as sufficient
justification for regulation of abortion pre-viability).
118
119
120

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007).
Multiple Pregnancy Associated with Infertility Therapy, supra note 97.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.

121

The Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reproductive Med. & The Practice Comm. of the Soc’y for
Assisted Reproductive Tech., Guidelines on Number of Embryos Transferred, 92 FERTILITY & STERILITY, no. 5, Nov.
2009, at 1518- 19, available at http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/
Practice_Guidelines/Guidelines_and_Minimum_Standards/Guidelines_on_number_of_embryos(1). pdf.
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attempts or other indicia of a less favorable prognosis.122
Moreover, multiple births result from a variety of causes. Significantly, ovarian
induction and super-ovulation, two kinds of fertility drug treatments, are actually responsible for a
greater percentage of high-order multiple gestations than ART.123 Yet calls for legislative
restrictions on use of fertility drugs have been rare.124 Moreover, the number of twin births
resulting from causes other than ART far exceeds the number resulting from ART, though ART
certainly has contributed to an increase.125 Indeed, the rise in multiple births in recent decades
can likely be attributed in significant part to delays in childbearing, as multiple births increase as
the mother’s age increases, even for children conceived naturally.126 These facts suggest that if
the asserted justification is protecting mother and future child health, the regulation is
significantly under-inclusive. The regulation is over-inclusive, as well, because not every transfer
in excess of the stated limit will result in multiple pregnancies or in serious complications for the
mother or children. The most recent data from the CDC reveals that even when three or more
embryos are transferred, of the cycles resulting in live births, most are of singletons, with the
proportion of higher order multiples a relatively small percentage (under 5%).127
Inevitably, medical procedures involve some risks. How much justifies state
infringement when fundamental rights are at stake? Any use of IVF may increase risks for
mothers and children, even when children are born as singletons.128 For example, IVF appears to
pose an increased risk of placenta previa, a pregnancy complication in which the placenta grows

122

Id.

123

Id.; Fertility Drugs Contribute Heavily to Multiple Births, SCIENCEDAILY (Jan. 24, 2010),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/01/100120104002.htm (stating more than one in five multiple births resulted
from fertility drugs alone).
124

See Noah, supra note 15 (arguing in favor of FDA bans or restrictions on ovulation-inducing drugs). Cf.
Rosato, supra note 14, at 86, 88 (arguing for legal limitations to the number of pre-embryos implanted and licensing
sanctions against physicians with excessive rate of super-multiples); Strong, infra note 144, at 278-79 (2003) (noting
suggestion that physicians performing ovarian stimulation be licensed).
125

Joyce A. Martin et al., National Vital Statistics Reports, Births: Final Data for 2005, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56_06.pdf (accessed Apr. 24, 2010) (showing ART therapies alone
accounting for only 17 percent of twin births).
126

Victoria Clay Wright et al., Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance 2001, United States, CTR.
DISEASE CONTROL (April 30, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5301a1.htm; MULTIPLE
PREGNANCY OVERVIEW, NEW YORK PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL, http://nyp.org/health/pregnant-mpover.html (last visited
July 25, 2010). Feminists need to be wary of policies that directly or indirectly penalize women who delay childbearing.
For an insightful exploration on the relationship between ART and workplace pressures that lead women to delay
childbearing at the expense of their fertility, see Michelle Goodwin, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Double
Bind: The Illusory Choice of Motherhood, 9 J. GEN. RACE & JUSTICE 1 (2005) [hereinafter Goodwin, Double Bind].
FOR

127

ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC
REPORTS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION Table 35, 49 (Dec. 2010). Recent data from Canada show a
similar pattern. Of the cycles transferring three or more embryos, the triplet birth rate was 4.3%. Joanne Gunby et al.,
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) in Canada: 2006 Results from the Canadian ART Register, 93 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 2189, 2196 (May 2010). Moreover, for all cycles resulting in live birth, overall almost 30% resulted in
multiples, but only 1.2% were triplets and only one was a quadruplet birth. Id. at 2191.
128

Diana B. Welmerink et al., Infertility Treatment Use in Relation to Selected Adverse Birth Outcomes, 94
FERTILITY & STERILITY 2580 (2010). See also Suter, Repugnance, supra note 49, at 1523, n.57; Rosato, supra note 14, at
77-78.
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over the cervix.129 Placenta previa can lead to bleeding, premature delivery and major
complications, including death, for mother and baby.130 However, the actual percentage of
women developing placenta previa after infertility treatment (including, but not limited to IVF)
was still only 2.0, compared to 0.6 for women conceiving spontaneously.131 Thus although the
percentage of increased risk was high (more than double), 98% of infertile women did not
experience this complication, and, without treatment, would not have been able to conceive and
carry a child to term. Moreover, the authors could not conclusively determine whether the
increased risk of placenta previa (and other conditions observed) resulted from the treatment itself
or some characteristic inherent in the conceiving couple.132 Would the increased risk of placenta
previa warrant a prohibition on all IVF? It seems highly unlikely.133 Similarly, a prenatal
diagnostic test, chorionic villi sampling (CVS) poses a nearly two percent risk of miscarriage, yet
no one has suggested legislatively banning the procedure, and it is a commonly used screening
method.134
Ultimately, no bright-line rule tells us when a given procedure or treatment poses too
great a risk of harm to justify its use. Rather, physicians operating under principles of ethics and
tort law, as well as regulatory agencies, rely on cost-benefit analysis, as do courts.135 As a frame
of reference, one commentator argued against mandatory anti-retroviral treatment for HIV
positive pregnant women, stating: “Because the risk of HIV infection to the child, absent antiviral
treatment is approximately one in four, a decision by a mother to “play the odds” cannot clearly
be characterized as not in the child’s best interest.”136 By contrast, in Pemberton v. Tallahassee
Mem. Reg. Med. Cen., Inc.,137 a federal district court found that a risk of uterine rupture estimated
from 2 to 10 percent (depending on the expert testifying), which would have created a 50 percent
chance of fetal death, was sufficient to compel a cesarean section without the woman’s consent.
In advocating for embryo transfer restrictions, a state would have difficulty establishing
that the risk of serious health problems for the mother and child is sufficient to limit legislatively
the number of embryos transferred, given that such a limit could effectively preclude the birth of a
129
130

Welmerink, supra note 128.
Placenta Previa, GOOGLE HEALTH, https://health.google.com/health/ref/Placenta+previa (last visited

June 28, 2010).
131
132

Welmerink, supra note 128, at Table 2.
Id.

133

But cf. Noah, supra note 15, at 652 (suggesting that the FDA might prevent the use of intracytoplasmic
sperm injection (ICSI) if it causes increases in birth defects following IVF).
134

Antenatal Testing, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHILDREN’S HEALTH,
Antenatal-Testing.html (last visited June 28, 2010).

http://www.healthofchildren.com/A/

135

The use of cost-benefit analysis, rather than specific standards, remains a cornerstone of tort law. See
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, 277, 340 (2000). Judge Learned Hand expressed this idea algebraically in the
famous case United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). Similarly, the FDA weighs risks and benefits
in deciding whether to approve drugs. Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, A Drug By Any Other Name . . . ?: Paradoxes In
Dietary Supplement Risk Regulation, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.165, 187 (2006) (“Thus, balancing of risks and benefits is
fundamental to the process of evaluating a new drug, and the agency may opt to tolerate very serious risks if the product
offers a novel and important benefit.”).
136

Michael A. Grizzi, Recent Developments: Compelled Antiviral Treatment of HIV Positive Pregnant
Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 473, 489-490 (1995).
137

66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1253 (N.D. Fla. 1999).
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child altogether and given that the prevailing medical consensus in the United States underlines
the need for individualized determination in each case.138 Even reproductive endocrinologists
seeking to promote single embryo transfer note the difficulty of determining when it is
appropriate.139 These authors note that optimal treatment may involve a “heavy load transfer”—
transfer of a high number of embryos—for certain groups of women who may need it to initiate
and sustain pregnancies of any kind.140
There are also alternative ways of achieving the state’s goals, including improved
education of patients and enhanced informed consent regarding the risks of transferring multiple
embryos, as well as policing by state medical boards and professional societies. In fact, some
evidence suggests that self-regulatory efforts have had some impact in stabilizing the rate of twin
births and reducing the incidence of higher order multiples resulting from ART.141 Multifetal
reduction is also an option that leaves the decision in the hands of the woman and her doctor.142
Multifetal reduction involves the termination by injection of one or more of the developing
fetuses in order to reduce the pregnancy to a safer size.143 However, some view multifetal
reduction as a negative by-product of excessive embryo transfer, rather than as a desirable
alternative to carrying a multifetal pregnancy to term. It can pose risks to the remaining fetuses,
and some women object to the procedure for religious, philosophical, emotional, or other
reasons.144
Supporters of a transfer limit can also argue that the dramatic increase in serious
complications for mother and child once the number of embryos transferred exceeds two justifies
the restrictions. The fact that other causes of multiple births remain does not mean the restriction
138
139
140

See ASRM guidelines discussed supra note 121 and accompanying text.
Gerris & De Sutter, supra note 34, at 62-63.
Id. at 62.

141

See Joyce A. Martin, et al., Center for Disease Control, Births: Final Data for 2006, 57 NAT’L VITAL
STATISTICS REPS., NO. 7, JAN. 7, 2009. (reporting stabilization in the rate of twin births and continued decline in the rate of
higher order multiple births and noting the effect of ASRM guidelines on declines in embryo transfers), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57_07.pdf; Multiple Pregnancy Associated with Infertility Therapy, supra
note 97 (noting that the rate of twin pregnancies remained stable while the “number of triplet or greater pregnancies
resulting from ART cycles has decreased from 7.0% in 1996 to 3.8% in 2002, and to 3.2% in 2003”). See also Ulla Britt
Wennerholm, The Risks Associated with Multiple Pregnancy, in SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER (Gerris et al., eds., 2009).
But see Gunby, supra note 127 at 2198 (noting the “lack of progress in reducing multiple births” from 2005 to 2006,
despite practitioners being “close” to meeting recommendations similar to ASRM guidelines for the number of embryos
transferred).
142

Noah, supra note 15, at 654-55 (2003); Mark I. Evans & David W. Britt, Multifetal Pregnancy
LIBRARY
OF
WOMEN’S
MED.,
http://www.glowm.com/index.html?p=glowm.cm
Reduction,
GLOBAL
l/section_view&articleid=214 (last visited June 22, 2010).
143

Stacey Pinchuk, A Difficult Choice in a Different Voice: Multiple Births, Selective Reduction and
Abortion, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 29, 30 (2000).
144

See Multiple Pregnancy Associated with Infertility Therapy, supra note 97; Adamson, supra note 14, at
253; Carson Strong, Too Many Twins, Triplets, Quadruplets, And So On: A Call For New Priorities, 31 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 272, 275 (2003); Sivinski, supra note 34, at 906; Liza Mundy, Too Much to Carry? WASH. POST, May 20, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/15/AR2007051501730.html.
Undoubtedly because of its resemblance to abortion, it is almost impossible to imagine the enactment of
legislation compelling multifetal reduction or that a court would sustain it as a constitutional matter, yet many have little
difficulty calling for embryo transfer restrictions that effectively foreclose procreation for some women.
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on this particular cause is not narrowly tailored. Certainly when it comes to pharmaceutical
agents affecting reproduction, we know the state has the power to restrict or prohibit access
altogether for agents deemed to pose unacceptable health risks.145 Thus even if strict scrutiny
applied, a court might uphold an embryo transfer restriction statute.
2. The Undue Burden Standard
How does the analysis change under the undue burden approach? The Supreme Court
has defined an undue burden as one that places “. . . a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion . . .,”146 or, in this case, seeking to procreate. In other words, how
burdensome is the restriction? The proper method of quantifying that burden has generated
controversy and confusion.147 In evaluating a provision requiring spousal notification before a
woman could obtain an abortion Casey stated, “The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the
group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”148 Casey
defined the target group as those directly affected by the legislation: married women who wish to
have an abortion without notifying their husbands, and who do not fit into one of the statutory
exceptions. For a “large fraction” of those cases, the spousal notice requirement operated as a
substantial obstacle and was thus unconstitutional.149 By analogy then, the question in the present
analysis would be whether the embryo transfer restriction would pose a substantial obstacle for
those women who want to exceed the statutory limit.
For a woman who is unlikely to get pregnant and successfully carry a child to term if
limited to transfer of the specified number of embryos, the burden would indeed be substantial.
Options might include undergoing additional cycles of fresh IVF, with the attendant risks of
ovarian stimulation and retrieval150 and which might not provide eggs or embryos of sufficient
145

See What Does FDA Regulate?, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/Basics/ucm194879.htm (last visited June 30, 2010); FDA Fundamentals, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Basics/ucm192695.htm (last visited June 30, 2010).
146

Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 878.

147

See id. at 886-87 (“We . . . disagree with the District Court’s conclusion that the ‘particularly
burdensome’ effects of the waiting period on some women require its invalidation. A particular burden is not of necessity
a substantial obstacle. Whether a burden falls on a particular group is a distinct inquiry from whether it is a substantial
obstacle even as to the women in that group.”); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 188 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(rejecting majority’s use of “large fraction” analysis of undue burden when judging lack of health exception to partial-birth
abortion ban). For additional discussion, see generally Beth A. Burskstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman: Availability and
Culpability in Reproductive Health Jurisprudence, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 97 (2010); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the
Undue Burden Standard, and the Evisceration of Women’s Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291 (2010); Helena
Silverstein, In the Matter of Anonymous, A Minor: Fetal Representation in Hearings to Waive Parental Consent for
Abortion 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 73-76 (2001) (discussing whether a parental consent requirement for minors
seeking abortion amounts to a substantial obstacle); Hannah Stahle, Fetal Pain Legislation: An Undue Burden, 10
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 251 (2007) (discussing fetal pain statutes and the obstacles they put on a physician’s ability to
perform an abortion, and whether this amounts to a substantial obstacle for woman); Sarah E. Weber, An Attempt to
Legislate Morality: Forced Ultrasounds as the Newest Tactic in Anti-Abortion Legislation, 45 TULSA L. REV. 359 (2009)
(discussing forced ultrasounds).
148
149
150

Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 894.
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 894-95.
Some women who take fertility medicine to stimulate egg production develop ovarian hyperstimulation
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quality;151 using frozen embryos, if any are available;152 and in either case, considerable additional
expense,153 which may well be prohibitive. Moreover, in some cases the restriction would
effectively prevent procreation, similar to the women for whom a spousal notice requirement
would essentially block their right to an abortion. Women older than 40 or with a history of poor
ovarian response or previous failed IVF attempts would fall into this category.154
This problem is particularly acute under the Georgia bill. In addition to limiting the
number of embryos transferred to three for women older than 40, it prohibits physicians from
creating more than that number of embryos in a given IVF cycle (to avoid the possibility of
destroying the excess embryos).155 This provision would further increase the burden on affected
women, as the quality of the embryo plays a key role in assessing how many embryos to transfer
in order to optimize the chance of a successful pregnancy.156 Quality can only be determined by
allowing the embryo to develop after fertilization.157 Thus, a woman who fertilizes the maximum
number allowed for transfer might well end up with fewer embryos of sufficient quality for
transfer, further impairing her chance of initiating a successful pregnancy.

syndrome (OHSS). OHSS can cause significant weight gain in a short period of time, reduced urination, severe pain or
swelling in the abdomen, and, in rare cases, life threatening complications. Nat’l Insts. of Health, Ovarian
Hyperstimulation Syndrome, MEDILINEPLUS, , http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/007294.htm (last visited
Ovarian
Hyperstimulation
Syndrome,
MAYOCLINIC.COM,
Apr.
24,
2010);
Mayo
Clinic
staff,
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/ovarian-hyperstimulation-syndrome-ohss/DS01097/METHOD=print (last visited Aug.
16, 2010).
151

Jonathan Van Blerkom, An Overview of Determinants of Oocyte and Embryo Developmental
Competence: Specificity, Accuracy and Applicability in Clinical IVF, in SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER 17 (Gerris, et al.,
eds., 2009).
152

The availability of extra embryos for freezing decreases sharply with age. Saswati Sunderam et al.,
Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance – United States, 2006, 58 Center for Disease Control Surveillance
Summaries, no. SS—5, June 12, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml
/ss5805a1.htm?s_cid=ss5805a1_x [hereinafter Sunderam, Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance], (transfers with
frozen embryos have a lower success rate than with fresh). See 2005 Assisted Reproductive Technology Report: Section
3—ART Cycles Using Frozen, Nondonor Embryos, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, http://www.cdc.gov
/ART/ART2005/sect3_fig42-43.htm#f42 (last visited Apr. 24, 2010) (showing use of transfers of thawed embryos results
in live births only 28% of the time compared to transfers using fresh results in live births 34.3% of the time). In addition,
some embryos may not survive the thawing process. See Aila Tiitinen, Cryo-Augmentation After Single Embryo Transfer:
The European Experience, in SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER 121, 124 (Jan Gerris, et al., eds. 2009).
153

See, e.g., Jim Hawkins, Financing Fertility, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115, 115 (2010) (noting that one
treatment of IVF costs over $12,000 for a single cycle); Mary Shedden, The Financial Challenge of Overcoming
Infertility, WRBL NEWS, http://www2.wrbl.com/rbl/news/local/article/the_financial_challenge_of_overcoming_infertility/
145053/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2010).
154
155

Gerris & De Sutter, supra note 34, at 62.
S.B. 169, Gen. Assem. (Ga. 2009) (as introduced). See supra note 30 and accompanying text.

156

Mark Henderson, Embryo ‘Quality Check’ Could Double IVF Success Rate, THE TIMES, Nov. 10, 2008,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/science/article5119721.ece; John M. Norian et al., An American Perspective on
Single Embryo Transfer, in SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER 272 (Jan Gerris, et al., eds., 2009).
157

Lynette Scott, Sequential Embryo Selection for Single Embryo Transfer, in SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER
109-16 (Jan Gerris, et al., eds., 2009). Transfer of blastocysts on day 5 or 6 after fertilization has a higher implantation
rate than embryos transferred at day 2 or 3 after fertilization, though not all embryos will survive to the blastocyst stage
and blastocyst transfer carries its own risks. See Adamson, supra note 14, at 252.
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However, Carhart v. Gonzales158 casts considerable doubt on the persuasiveness of this
argument. In Carhart, the Court upheld a federal law that prohibited a specific medical
procedure—dilation and evacuation (“D & E”), also known as partial-birth abortion —using the
undue burden standard.159 The Carhart Court seemed to veer away from the Casey mode of
analysis, suggesting that the proper method was to evaluate the percentage of women negatively
affected by the restriction compared to the total number of women undergoing the procedure.160
If so, it is possible that out of the entire population of women undergoing IVF, relatively few
women will be affected by the restriction. Under this analysis, the statute might not impose an
undue burden.
The Court upheld the law in Carhart even though it admitted that there is uncertainty
about whether the prohibition of the D & E procedure would put women’s health at risk.161 The
Court also took pains to emphasize that abortion doctors were subject to the same treatment as
other physicians; in other words, like other doctors, they were not entitled to “unfettered choice in
the course of their medical practice.”162 Carhart makes clear that the state interest in protecting
potential life and the integrity of the medical profession can justify prohibitions on specific
medical procedures, despite their potential efficacy in effectuating women’s reproductive choices
and even if the available alternatives might pose additional risks to a woman’s health. Neither the
prospect of additional expense, inconvenience, or even additional risks to mother’s health sufficed
to establish an undue burden.163
Given the availability of cryopreservation of excess embryos as an alternative, Carhart
provides considerable support for a court to uphold embryo transfer restrictions. However, even
Carhart acknowledged that the ban on partial-birth abortion might be unconstitutional as applied
to a woman whose health would be seriously compromised by use of another late-term
procedure.164 Hence an “as applied” challenge to an embryo transfer restriction might succeed
where a facial attack would not. However, the difficulty of actually finding plaintiffs to pursue
such a challenge, given the long timeframe of litigation, would render this option more illusory
than real.165 The chance of a woman achieving a live birth through IVF decreases dramatically as
she ages, at least when she is using her own eggs.166 Moreover, decisions about how many
embryos to transfer typically depend on how many of them successfully fertilize and develop and
158
159

550 U.S. 124 (2007).
Id. at 156.

160

Id. at 140 (examining the percentage certain abortion procedures used in second-trimester abortions).
Justice Ginsburg attacked the majority for misapplying the Casey test. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 188 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority’s use of the “large fraction” analysis of undue burden when judging lack of a
health exception to the partial-birth abortion ban).
161
162
163
164

Id. at 162.
Id. at 163.
Carhart, 550 U.S. at 164, 166.
Id. at 167.

165

See Suter, Repugnance, supra note 49, at 1575 (noting the difficulty of mounting an as applied challenge
to the partial birth abortion statute) and at n.345 (discussing the controversy about the standards for facial constitutional
challenges in abortion cases); Carhart, 550 U.S. at 89-90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing inadvisability of relying on
as applied challenge).
166

SUNDERAM, supra note 152. The chance of a live birth for a woman as she ages may decrease even for
women using donor eggs in certain circumstances, though the decline is slight. Id.
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on the quality of the embryos.167 Hence the need to transfer more than some statutory limit might
not be apparent until the day of the scheduled embryo transfer. Any delay would render the
problem moot, as careful timing is essential to the procedure. The only alternative would be to
cryopreserve any excess embryos, again requiring the additional expense and physical burdens of
another cycle of IVF.168
Thus, although I believe there are strong arguments in favor of a constitutional challenge
to transfer restrictions, jurisprudence in this area is far from coherent and the ultimate resolution is
clearly open to debate. The question then becomes whether, even if restrictions could pass
constitutional muster, they constitute good policy.
III. “BAD” MOTHERS LEAD TO BAD POLICY
The strongest argument in favor of an embryo transfer restriction is that it has the
potential to further reduce the risk of multiple births and their attendant problems. While I argue
that physicians and patients can exercise appropriate medical judgment without legislative
interference and should be left to do so, I am aware that for reasons both financial and emotional,
patients may exert pressure on physicians to pursue more aggressive treatment than they would
otherwise recommend.169 The widespread dearth of insurance coverage coupled with the high
cost of fertility treatment may lead patients to seek to maximize their chances in any given cycle,
even at the risk of increasing the odds of a multiple birth.170 Indeed, some patients, especially
those using surrogate carriers, may actively seek twins as a cost and stress saving measure.171

167

Guidelines on Number of Embryos Transferred, 92 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1518 (2009); John M.
Norian, et al., An American Perspective on Single Embryo Transfer, in SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER 274 (Jan Gerris et al.,
eds., 2009) (discussing the need to determine number of embryos for transfer based on embryo quality and age); Michelle
Brandt, Stanford Researchers Find Way to Predict IVF Success, STANFORD SCHOOL OF MED. (July 1, 2008),
http://med.stanford.edu/news_releases/2008/july/IVF.html. R. Dale McClure, Birth of Octuplets Raises Questions, WASH.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at M13 (“When making a recommendation, the physician takes into account the diagnosis of the
patient, her age, her prior experiences with medical treatment and the quality and quantity of embryos available”).
168

Of course, physicians might bring the challenge instead and could avoid the mootness problem, as they
would likely repeatedly encounter women patients needing to exceed the statutory limit without time to litigate the
question. See Federal Election Commission v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007) (discussing “established
exception to mootness for disputes capable of repetition, yet evading review”). However, even this option would not
protect women in all cases. The reasons why a patient might need to transfer more than the legislative limit vary widely.
Capturing the range of situations would likely require multiple lawsuits, which still might not account for all situations.
As Justice Ginsburg noted in Carhart, relying on an “‘as-applied challenge in a discrete case’ . . . jeopardizes women’s
health and places doctors in an untenable position. Even if courts were able to carve out exceptions through piecemeal
litigation for ‘discrete and well-defined instances,’ women whose circumstances have not been anticipated by prior
litigation could well be left unprotected.” Carhart, 550 U.S. at 190 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
169

Sivinski, supra note 34, at 901-05 (2010); Strong, supra note 144, at 275; MAKING THE RIGHT CHOICES
WHEN IT COMES TO MULTIPLES, YALE FERTILITY CTR. (Apr. 24, 2010), http://medicine.yale.edu/ysminfo
/top_story/2009/03/06032009.html.
170

Hawkins, supra note 153, at 157.

171

Mundy, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE, supra note 33, at 214. See also Mary D’Alton, Infertility and the
Desire for Multiple Births, 81 FERTILITY & STERILITY 523 (2004) (noting that 20% of women surveyed in study by Ginny
L. Ryan et al., preferred multiple birth; 94% seeking twins); Guido Pennings, Philosophical and Ethical Considerations on
Single Embryo Transfer, in SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER 200 (Jan Gerris et al., eds., 2009).
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Age and notions of ideal family configuration may also play a role in patient preferences.172
Physicians are also under pressure to post high success rates, which may influence their decisions
about the number of embryos to transfer.173 These legitimate concerns, though, are far
outweighed by the context in which the debate about this issue is taking place.
A. Putting the Restrictions into Context: Another Salvo in the War on Women’s Reproductive
Freedom and Medical Autonomy
We cannot view legislative responses to the Suleman case in isolation. Efforts to limit
access to and regulate the practice of ART have been driven, at least in part, by pro-life advocates
whose goal is to further erode women’s reproductive freedom. They have had considerable
success in recent years in the courts and legislatively in chipping away at a woman’s right to
choose.174 The Supreme Court’s most recent abortion decision in Carhart boldly undermined
women’s right to choose by upholding a ban on a late-term abortion procedure, despite ample
evidence of the risk to women’s health in doing so.175
The same forces are at work here, and their influence sets the United States apart from
other countries that regulate the number of embryos transferred.176 The Missouri bill, which
would establish American Society of Reproductive Medicine guidelines as legal limits on
transfer,177 was introduced by Robert Schaaf,178 a self-identified anti-abortion and anti-stem cell
research Christian physician, and Gayle Kingery,179 also a pro-life Republican and sponsor of a
2007 bill that would prohibit minors from consenting to prescription contraception without a court
order.180 As for the Georgia bill, it goes significantly beyond restricting the number of embryos
for transfer. Titled the “Ethical Treatment of Human Embryos Act,” it would, among other
things, prohibit stem cell research, declare that a human embryo is a “biological human being who
is not the property of any person or entity,” nullify any contract that describes the embryo in such
terms, prohibit intentional destruction of any embryo and resolve disputes over embryos
172

Pennings, supra note 171 at 202.

173

See, e.g., Strong, supra note 144, at 275; Sivinski, supra note 34, at 905; Rosato, supra note 14, at 72;
Pinchuk, supra note 143, at 50-52. This concern appears to be overblown.
174

See generally State Policies in Brief, An Overview of Abortion Laws, THE GUTTMACHER INST.,
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf; State Policies in Brief, Counseling and Waiting Periods for
Abortion, THE GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf; Rachel Benson Gold,
All That’s Old is New Again: The Long Campaign to Persuade Women to Forego Abortion, GUTTMACHER POL. REV. 19
(Spring 2009), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/12/2/gpr120219.html.
175

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 164, 166 (2007).

176

See Strong, supra note 144, at 279 (noting difference between strength of anti-abortion groups in U.S.
and in Great Britain and observing relative lack of “excessive politicization” in embryo transfer regulation in Britain).
177

H. B. 810, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009).

178

Rep.
Robert
Schaaf,
Dist.
028,
Republican,
MISSOURI
HOUSE
OF
REPS.,
http://house.mo.gov/bio.aspx?year=2010&district=028 (last visited Nov. 8, 2010); Issues, ROBERT SCHAAF FOR STATE
SENATE, http://www.schaafforsenate.com/issues (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
179

Representative Gayle Kingery, District 154, Republican, MISSOURI HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://house.mo.gov/bio.aspx?year=2010&district=154 (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
180

H.B. 617, 94th Gen. Assemb. (Mo. 2007) (prohibiting a minor from self-consenting for a prescription
for a contraceptive drug or device unless a petition is granted by a juvenile court).
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according to the “best interest” of the embryo, thus largely stripping the creators of the embryos—
the intended parents—of control over the embryos’ fate.181
Moreover, I am deeply skeptical of the state’s effort to micromanage the doctor-patient
relationship in this arena, given its track record involving other aspects of women’s medical care
related to reproduction—namely abortion and state interference with pregnant women’s conduct.
The devolution of informed consent doctrine in the area of women’s reproduction provides a
telling case in point. For at least a half century, courts have recognized the importance of patient
autonomy and the critical role informed consent plays in safeguarding the exercise of that
autonomy.182 Informed consent aims to ensure that patients make the ultimate decisions about
their health care by requiring that physicians provide sufficient information for them to do so.183
Doctors who fail to disclose adequate information about the proposed treatment face civil
liability.184 Modern informed consent doctrine rejects the paternalistic model of “doctor knows
best” that previously dominated. Current models of informed consent envision collaboration
between patient and doctor to facilitate the patient’s exercise of her autonomy.185
Yet recent cases and statutes have severely undercut that autonomy for women while at
times imposing onerous obligations on physicians. Carhart asserted that by prohibiting the D &
E medical procedure, it was merely treating abortion doctors like any other physicians. However,
looking at regulation of medical procedures generally, legislators have subjected doctors involved
with women’s reproductive health to unprecedented regulation and most often in a patronizing
way that particularly burdens the woman’s exercise of reproductive freedom.186 A Westlaw
survey of statutes dealing with informed consent reveals three primary areas of regulation: mental
health treatment, medical treatment of minors, and treatment related to women’s reproduction.187
Once again, we see women classified with children and the mentally ill.188
More than half the states have enacted abortion statutes that impose waiting periods
181

S.B. 169, Gen. Assemb. (Ga. 2009) (as introduced). The Georgia bill avoids the paradox identified
earlier of elevating the interests of the embryo in life while limiting the number allowed for implantation, by prohibiting
physicians from creating more embryos than permitted for transfer. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
182

See generally Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that doctors have a duty to
disclose); Cruzan v. Director ,Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
183
184

Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 924 (1994).
Id. at 927.

185

Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment?: Consent, Care, Privacy, and Social Meaning in
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 48 (2002). See also Sharon N. Covington, Counseling
Patients for Single Embryo Transfer in SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER 154 (Jan Gerris et al., eds., 2009) (describing shared
decision making as “model of choice for complex medical decisions involving more than one reasonable treatment
option”); Tracy Dobson, Medical Malpractice in the Birthplace: Resolving the Physician-Patient Conflict Through
Informed Consent, Standard of Care, and Assumption of Risk, 65 NEB. L. REV. 655, 684 (1986) (advocating for shared
decision-making and patient self-determination in birth related decisions).
186

See B. Jessie Hill, Reproductive Rights as Health Care Rights, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 501, 549
(2009) (observing the “uniquely onerous regulation of abortion” and noting that “many of the legal restrictions that apply
to abortion providers would probably strike other physicians as outrageous if applied to them”).
187

The following search was run on July 14, 2010 in the “all state statutes” and “50 state survey” databases:
Informed written /s consent /p physician doctor /p treat!.
188

Dan L. Burk, DNA Rules: Legal and Conceptual Implications of Biological “Lock-Out” Systems, 92
CAL. L. REV. 1553, 1580 (2004) (noting “historical inclusion of women together with children and mentally handicapped
individuals as legal incompetents”).
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and/or highly detailed informed consent requirements.189 Legislation recently passed in
Oklahoma over a gubernatorial veto presents one of the more egregious examples of this kind of
regulation. Oklahoma already had a 24-hour waiting period and a requirement that detailed
“informed consent” materials, including gestational photos, be provided to a woman seeking an
abortion.190 Oklahoma House Bill 2780, enacted in April 2010, now mandates that a physician
perform an ultrasound on a woman seeking an abortion prior to obtaining informed consent for
the procedure.191 Of course, by doing so, the law actually compels the woman to submit to the
ultrasound procedure regardless of her consent. The law further requires that the physician
simultaneously explain what the ultrasound is depicting, display the ultrasound so the woman can
see the images and give a medical description of the images, including the dimensions of any
fetus or embryo and the presence of any organs.192 Lest one think the law is unduly coercive, rest
assured that it contains language expressly allowing the woman not to look:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a pregnant woman from
averting her eyes from the ultrasound images required to be provided to and
reviewed with her. Neither the physician, nor the pregnant woman shall be
subject to any penalty if she refuses to look at the presented ultrasound
images.193
The law is silent as to whether the woman can choose to block out the narrative by wearing an IPod or other similar device during the procedure. Although the Center for Reproductive Rights
quickly challenged the law and the Oklahoma attorney general has temporarily blocked
enforcement, the ultimate outcome remains uncertain.194 Nor is the Oklahoma law unique: in
2010, the Florida legislature passed a similar law, subsequently vetoed by the governor, and
mandatory ultrasound bills have been introduced in Kentucky, Rhode Island, Montana, and
Louisiana.195
Moreover, a recently-enacted Nebraska anti-abortion statute takes the coercion to a new
level.196 Abortion providers under this statute must now engage in an extremely detailed risk
189

WHO DECIDES? THE STATUS OF WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, NARAL
PRO-CHOICE AMERICA 12 (JAN. 2011), available at http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/government-and-you/whodecides/who-decides-2011.pdf. See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,881-87.
190

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 §§ 1-738.2-1-738.3. Similar requirements in a Kentucky statute, KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 311.725 (West 2009), were largely upheld by a Kentucky court, although a Kentucky requirement of “in
person” delivery of the materials was ruled unenforceable. Eubanks v. Schmidt, 126 F.Supp.2d 451 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
191

Act of April 27, 2010, 2010 OKLA. SESS. LAW SERV. 173 (West) (mandating that physicians perform
ultrasounds on women seeking abortions).
192
193

Id. § 2 (A) (2)-(4).
Id.§ 2 (C).

194

Legal Challenge Blocks Oklahoma Law Requiring Ultrasound Before Abortion, CATH. NEWS AGENCY,
May 5, 2010, http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/legal_challenge_blocks_oklahoma_law_requiring_ultrasound_
before_abortion/. A federal district court in Oklahoma struck down a prior bill containing a similar provision without
reaching the merits of the ultrasound provision. Oklahoma Abortion Law Overturned, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/19/nation/na-abortion19.
195

H.B. 373, 10th Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2010); H.B. 7489, Gen. Assem. (R.I. 2010); H.B. 280, 62nd Legis. (Mt.
2011). S.B. 528, Reg. Sess. (La. 2010).
196

2010 Nebraska Laws L.B. 594.
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assessment of women seeking abortions prior to performing the procedure. The risk assessment
requires the physician to determine whether the “risks” of bearing the child outweigh the “risks”
of the abortion, all ostensibly to protect the woman’s mental health. The statute explicitly defines
these risks to include “physical, psychological, emotional, demographic, or situational factor[s]”
as well as “familial” risks.197 How a physician is to evaluate and weigh the extent of the
“situational” and “familial” risks to the patient is anybody’s guess. And, of course, the statute
fails to note the irony of insisting that a woman’s consent to abortion is only “voluntary and
informed”198 by imposing a requirement that destroys the bedrock of the doctrine of “informed
consent”—the patient’s right to weigh the risks for herself.
Some may call foul at the equation of statutes restricting the number of embryos
transferred and these abortion statutes. But I believe the connection is real and meaningful.
While the abortion statutes aim predominantly to curtail abortion as much as possible in order to
preserve fetal life, a goal openly sanctioned by the Casey Court,199 some who support statutorily
mandated informed consent for abortion may do so based on genuine concern that women do not
fully understand the implications and future impact on their well-being that the choice to abort
may have. Indeed the Carhart opinion gives credence to this notion, writing that:
While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort
the infant life they once created and sustained . . . In a decision so fraught with
emotional consequence some doctors may prefer not to disclose precise details
of the means that will be used . . . .”200
But rather than simply require informed consent, the Court ultimately “deprives women
of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety.”201 The Court thus
leaves the state free ostensibly to protect a woman from her own poor decision-making. Indeed,
Casey and, even more so, Carhart, have turned the common law doctrine of informed consent on
its head in a way that, at best, demeans women as autonomous decision-makers, and at worse
actively coerces them.202 The abortion cases reveal a disturbing trajectory that began with
rejection of statutorily-mandated informed consent, recognizing that the common law already
required it.203 Casey moved the trajectory sharply in another direction when it disapproved those
197
198
199

2010 Nebraska Laws L.B. 594 (§28-326(11) and §28-327(6)(a)).
2010 Nebraska Laws L.B. 594 (§28-327).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 883.

200

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007). Interestingly, the Court ignores extensive factual
findings by the District Courts regarding the harm women will suffer from a ban on D & E, id. at 178-79 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting), but draws this conclusion about women’s anticipated regrets without any evidence at all. Id. at 159.
201

Id. at 184 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

202

Indeed, the very notion, approved by the Court in Casey, that the state can express its interest in
discouraging abortion through informed consent requirements inherently undermines the foundation of informed consent:
free, voluntary and knowledgeable decision-making. Moreover, states have packed their informed consent materials with
patently false and misleading information. Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent an Abortion
Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 251-54 (2009).
203

Id. at 244-47 (discussing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)).
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earlier precedents and allowed a state to mandate so-called “informed consent” that the state could
use to try to persuade a woman not to have an abortion.204 It culminated in Carhart, which
allowed a state to ban a procedure entirely, at least partly because of concerns that physicians
would not provide adequate information—thereby completely eliminating the option of any kind
of “consent.”205
Mandatory ultrasound statutes like Oklahoma’s pervert the notion of informed consent in
an even more dramatic fashion. They actually subject a woman to an invasive medical procedure
without her consent, in the name of enhancing “informed” consent.206 Likewise, Nebraska’s “risk
assessment” statute requires a physician to weigh a host of factors having nothing to do with any
potential health risks to the woman, rather than allow the woman to exercise that judgment
independently. These cases and statutes send a very clear message: women are simply incapable
of making a decision whether to have an abortion and doctors cannot be trusted to give them the
appropriate information to do so without extreme measures imposed by the state.
Proposed embryo transfer limits operate the same way as the partial birth abortion ban
upheld in Casey: they completely bypass the possibility of achieving the desired result through
true informed consent. Instead, they prohibit the option altogether. In doing so, they inject the
state into the doctor-patient relationship and presume that the woman, left unrestrained, will
choose an undue risk to herself and the children she desperately seeks. Indeed, my choice of the
word “desperate” is intentional, for infertile women are frequently described as being both
desperate and irrational—and physicians unable or unwilling to resist them, a perception that the
Suleman case reinforces. This perception appears in the scholarly literature, as well as in the
popular press. 207 For example, Professor Marsha Garrison has written that “Regulation aimed at
protecting future children seems particularly important when the treatment in question is aimed at
achieving a sought-after pregnancy. Infertile would-be parents are much less likely than actual
parents, or even pregnant women who have decided to carry a pregnancy to term, to act in the best

204

Id. at 252.

205

Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159. In a 2006 article, Samuel Bagenstos anticipated this type of analysis. He
argued that the reliance of the abortion cases on an autonomy rationale left open the option of governmental regulation to
protect actors from threats to their exercise of free choice—be they social, financial or otherwise. In his view, such an
argument could be used to justify banning abortion altogether, a prospect that seems paradoxical, to say the least, but was
nonetheless the path followed in Carhart. Samuel R. Baganstos, Disability, Life, Death and Choice, 29 HARV. J. L. &
GENDER 425, 449-51 (2006). Others too have noted the irony. See, e.g., Suter, Repugnance, supra note 49, at 1578
(Justice Kennedy “condones state efforts to prevent uninformed choice by prohibiting choice altogether. Ronald Dworkin
highlights the irony of this analysis . . . .”).
206

Some may argue that ultrasound is only minimally invasive because it requires no bodily incision.
However, it does require the woman to lie on a table and submit to the application of gel and movement of the wand over
her abdominal area. Moreover, transvaginal ultrasound, increasingly performed in the early stages of pregnancy, requires
insertion of the ultrasound wand into the woman’s vagina—a procedure that would hardly qualify as minimally invasive.
Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351,
391-92 (2008).
207

See, e.g., Strong, supra note 144, at 275; Anna Mulrine, Making Babies It’s an Expensive Gamble, but
Childless Couples are Trying Reproductive Therapy in Record Numbers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 9, 2004,
http://health.usnews.com/usnews/health/articles/040927/27babies.htm. Cf. Mundy, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE, supra
note 33, at 214 (“Doctors are often eager to shift responsibility onto patients, against whose demands they portray
themselves as helpless.”).
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interests of their future children.”208 Professor Jennifer Rosato has expressed similar sentiments:
“Infertile women will often opt for any treatment option presented, regardless of the physical,
psychological, or financial price,” including depleting savings and risking foreclosure.209 She
describes parents using ART as “categorically conflicted,” and caught in an “emotional vortex”
that “causes them to obsess about conceiving, rather than carefully considering the quality of life
of the children. The power of wishful thinking obscures rational deliberation.”210 By
characterizing infertile women as “categorically conflicted” because of their obsession with
becoming parents, Rosato can justify intrusive state regulation of ART patients “in ways not
otherwise tolerated.”211
No one could credibly deny the emotional and financial stress felt by many of those who
undergo fertility treatment. But to denigrate a whole category of women as irrational and
incapable of acting in their (future) children’s best interests feeds directly into societal stereotypes
used to deny women autonomy in reproduction, medical decision-making and parenting. Indeed,
our common acceptance of the term “Octomom,” is itself revealing—we have reduced her to a
grotesque caricature of motherhood; she’s a creature, barely human and certainly not one that in
any way resembles our vision of a good mother.
B. Beyond Abortion: Using “Irrational” Women To Justify State Intervention
This perception of Suleman, and infertile women generally, as irrational undoubtedly
fueled the rapid-fire introduction of embryo transfer legislation—a response that seems
disproportionate given the many causes of pre-term birth and low birth weight. Rather than focus
on ensuring adherence to appropriate medical standards, educating patients about the risks of
multiple births, obtaining true informed consent, and providing insurance coverage or financing
that reduces the incentive for excessively aggressive treatment, we seek a partial solution, which
begins with interfering with the doctor-patient relationship, devaluing the decision-making
capacity of women, and furthering a right-wing agenda that seeks ultimately to control women’s
reproductive decision-making power.
We have seen this kind of effort before in response to the problem of drug-exposed
infants. Rather than provide adequate treatment, support and prenatal care, which might have
systemic impact, but requires spending money on a demonized segment of the population, states
began criminally prosecuting women for exposing their fetuses to drugs in utero.212 In
Charleston, South Carolina, a public hospital instituted a program compelling drug testing and
other measures of pregnant women who were suspected of drug use and came to the hospital to
deliver their babies.213 Positive results were forwarded to law enforcement, which used the results
to prosecute the women. The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately ruled the practice a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. The Court rejected the city’s attempt to justify the search as a means of
protecting women and children’s health, as the policy clearly emphasized the goal of prosecuting
208

Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623, 1642 (2008).

209

Rosato, supra note 14, at 72 (quoting Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing Over Embryos: Of Contracts and
Consents, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 897, 923 (2000)).
210
211
212
213

Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 106.
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70 (2001).
Id.
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the women and provided no special medical care related to the substance abuse, beyond referral
for treatment.214 While the Court invalidated the Charleston searches and other criminal
prosecutions of pregnant women have been overturned, some have been upheld.215 Moreover,
subjecting women to prosecution, regardless of the ultimate outcome, subjects them to grievous
harm.216 The racist and classist aspects of such prosecutions and other state interventions in
conduct during pregnancy and child-bearing compound the damage and have been welldocumented.217
Unlike the criminal prosecutions of pregnant drug addicts, proposed restrictions on
embryo transfer limits are not, generally speaking, directed at a similarly maligned group—
substance abusers and poor women of color. In fact, most users of ART are affluent whites.218 It
is all the more telling, then, that the visceral pubic response and the embryo transfer legislation at
issue here erupted in response to a woman who does not fit the norm. Suleman’s choice to pursue
repeated courses of IVF as a single, unemployed mother (not to mention a woman of color)219
makes her look, if not criminal like the pregnant drug abusers, at best lacking in judgment and at
worst, downright crazy and a danger to all her children. This depiction of irrational nearcriminality is especially pernicious when applied to women in this context who are actively
seeking to become mothers, because it violates societal norms defining what “good” mothers
should be. As Andrew Taslitz argued in considering the (mal)treatment of pregnant drug abusers
at issue in Ferguson, the “stigmatizing rage” felt toward these women reflected the violation of
societal norms about motherhood:
To be a mother in our culture is to take upon oneself the obligations of
“preservative love, nurturance, and training” of one’s children as a substantial
life responsibility. Preservation of the child’s physical health and security is
historically the preeminent of these demands. “A mother who callously
endangers her child’s well-being is simply not doing maternal work.” Indeed,
when such endangerment is intentional or extreme, the mother becomes a
“monster,” a hideous creature whose very survival endangers all that holds
society together. Children, hearth, and home collapse when a mother fails to fit
her assigned role.220

214

Id. at 82.

215

See, e.g., Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1 (1997) (child abuse conviction against mother based on ingesting
crack cocaine during the third trimester of pregnancy upheld); Jim McBride, Newborn Twins on Drugs at Birth,
AMARILLO GLOBE NEWS (June 12, 2004), http://www.amarillo.com/stories/061204/new_twindrugs.shtml) (describing the
first woman prosecuted on charges of delivery of marijuana to a minor for smoking marijuana while pregnant).
216

See Meghan Horn, Mothers Versus Babies: Constitutional and Policy Problems With Prosecutions for
Prenatal Maternal Substance Abuse, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 635, 638 (2008) (discussing cases where mothers
spent time in jail awaiting appeal for convictions relating to prenatal drug use).
217

Id. at 648-49; Andrea Marsh, Testing Pregnant Women and Newborns for HIV: Legal and Ethical
Responses to Public Health Efforts to Prevent Pediatric AIDS, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 195, 207-09; 211-12 (2001).
218

Rao, supra note 14, at 1478 (2008).

219

Suleman is of middle-eastern descent. Her father is Iraqi. Octuplets’ Family Filed For Bankruptcy,
CBS NEWS (Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/30/earlyshow/health/main4764432.shtml.
220

Taslitz, supra note 185, at 75 (quoting Sara Ruddick, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF
PEACE 17-18 (1995)).
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Nor can we ignore the racist and classist aspects of the societal response to Suleman.
Public reaction to her stands in dramatic contrast to the reaction to the birth of the McCaughey
septuplets a dozen years earlier to a white, religious married couple. The media greeted the
McCaughey birth with amazement, kudos and virtually no criticism of the family and very little of
the physician.221 Granted there were differences aside from race/ethnicity and marital and
employment status that set Suleman apart: She used IVF (as opposed to fertility drugs) and she
had six previous children conceived through IVF. By contrast, the McCaugheys had one previous
child, conceived with the help of a fertility drug.222 Nonetheless, the response to another high
order multiple birth, around the same time as the McCaughey birth, gives us cause for concern.
Grace Ochukwu, an African-American, gave birth to octuplets one year after the McCaughey’s.
The media response, although not approaching the vitriol spewed at Suleman, was nonetheless
markedly different from that enjoyed by the McCaugheys, prompting at least one commentator to
posit racism as the only possible explanation.223
These contemptuous attitudes evoke another line of cases that questioned women’s
ability to make choices about their reproduction and saw heavy-handed response by the state. In
the 1980s and 90s, courts decided several cases involving blood transfusions and C-sections
performed on pregnant women without their consent.224 These cases, like the restrictions here,
were justified by the need to protect the health of future born children and, in some cases, the
woman herself. While some appellate courts ruled that these actions violated the woman’s
statutory, common law or constitutional rights,225 others upheld the coercive action.226 In one
such case, Pemberton v. Tallahassee Reg. Med. Ctr,227 a federal district court in Florida ruled that
a hospital had not violated a woman’s constitutional rights when it performed a caesarean section
on her against her will after obtaining an order from the state court. Enforcement of the court
order entailed sending a police officer to her home and forcibly transporting her back to the
hospital by ambulance.228
221

Goodwin, Double Bind, supra note 126, at 40-42.

222

Michael D. Lemonick, It’s a Miracle, TIME, Dec. 1, 1997, at 34, 38, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,987455-3,00.html (accessed Aug. 15, 2010).
223

Pinchuk, supra note 143, at n.6 (quoting Robert Scheer, Iowa Seven, Houston Eight: A Difference-Only
Racism Explains Some Reactions to the Year-Apart Multiple Births, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1998, at B7). See also
Goodwin, supra note 126, at 40-42.
224

See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cty. Hosp. Authority, 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981); In re Baby Boy
Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
225

See, e.g., In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 405 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding the state may not override a
pregnant woman’s competent treatment decision to forego a blood transfusion for religious reasons); In re Baby Boy Doe,
632 N.E.2d at 330 (holding the common law protects the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment and
thus, a caesarean section, even when the fetus’ health is at risk); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (holding trial court
should not have ordered c-section without patient’s consent or use of substituted judgment).
226

Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cty. Hosp. Authority, 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981). In Jefferson, the court
ordered the c-section, but it never took place, as the mother did not return to the hospital. She subsequently delivered a
healthy baby vaginally, despite testimony by a physician that the probability of death to her was 50% and death to the
fetus was 99% if delivered vaginally. Jefferson, 274 S. E.2d at 458. See also In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (blood transfusion); Crouse Irving Mem. Hosp. v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985)
(blood transfusion).
227
228

66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999).
Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1250.
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In addition to coercing women’s choices about procreation, legislative limits on the
number of embryos transferred undercuts women’s authority as prospective parents. While the
restriction on embryo transfers, as already discussed, does not directly implicate the constitutional
right to parent, the law’s treatment of and deference to parental decision-making provide a useful
frame for viewing analogous decisions by women undergoing IVF to create a family. We know
that parents make decisions that subject their children to avoidable risks all the time, and unless
those risks rise to the level of abuse or neglect, the government, consistent with the Constitution,
typically may not intervene.229 For example, increasing numbers of parents have refused to
vaccinate their children based in significant part on unfounded concerns of a link between certain
vaccinations and autism.230 Despite a strong consensus among medical professionals about the
overall safety of vaccines,231 no effort has been made to compel vaccination over parental
objection,232 despite the undeniable benefits, not just to individual children, but also to the public
health.233 Diseases such as measles and whooping cough (pertussis), once thought to be nearly
eradicated in the U.S., are now reemerging in significant numbers.234 Although the Supreme
Court ruled long ago that the state can compel vaccination over parental objection,235 in 48 states
parents may opt out for religious reasons and in nearly half, based solely on personal
objections.236 In the context of medical treatment of children, courts have likewise adhered to the
principle of deference to parental choice unless the parental decision involves rejection of lifesaving treatment237 or, in a few cases, of treatment that would dramatically improve the child’s

229

Richard F. Storrow, The Bioethics of Prospective Parenthood: In Pursuit of the Proper Standard for
Gatekeeping in Infertility Clinics, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2283, 2302 (2007); In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL
2132014 (Tex. Ct. App. May 22, 2008) (stating that the Department of Family and Protective Services must show danger
to physical health or safety of children before removing from home).
230

Browning v. Sec. of Health and Human Servs., No. 02-0928V, 2010 WL 1407212 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 19,
2010); Immunization, AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.aap.org/immunization/
multimedia/news.html; An Interview with Dr. Geri Dawson, AUTISM SPEAKS (July 30, 2009), http://www.autismspeaks.
org/science/science_news/geri_dawson_vaccines_autism_interview.php.
231

VACCINE STUDIES: EXAMINE THE EVIDENCE, AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, http://www.aap.org
/immunization/families/faq/VaccineStudies.pdf (last accessed Apr. 25, 2010).
232

James G. Hodge & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements: Historical, Social, and
Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 833 (2002) (noting that each state has mandatory vaccination laws that are subject to
medical, religious, and philosophical objections).
233

Immunization Safety, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.who.int
/immunization_safety/en/.
234

See Serena Gordon, Measles Outbreak Triggered by Unvaccinated Child, BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK
(Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/lifestyle/content/healthday/637218.html; Christine S. Moyer, Pertussis
Epidemic In California Linked to Vaccination Gaps, AM. MED. NEWS (July 26. 2010), http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2010/07/26/prl10726.htm; Whooping Cough Epidemic May Be Worst In 50 Years, CAL. DEP’T. PUB.
HEALTH, (June 23, 2010), http://www.cdph.ca.gov/Pages/NR10-041.aspx.
235

Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).

236

States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School Immunization Requirements, NATL.
CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Oct. 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/health/schoolimmunizationexemptionlaws/tabid
/14376/default.aspx. See, e.g., Conscientious Objection to Public Health, Interim News, HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., TEXAS
H. R. (Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/interim/int78-1.pdf (describing Texas exemption).
237

Alicia R. Ouellette, Growth Attenuation, Parental Choice, and the Rights of Disabled Children: Lessons
from the Ashley X Case, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. POL’Y 207, 208 (2008) (“Only the exceptional parental choice, such as a
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quality of life.238 Indeed, more than forty states allow parents to reject even life-saving treatment
for their children if they are relying on spiritual care.239
The case for impinging on a parent’s decision-making authority regarding the relative
risks of IVF is arguably even weaker, since we must acknowledge once again the ontological
problem embedded in the claim: Women undergoing IVF may expose their future children to
risks in order to give them life. With IVF, the choice may not be between a risk of harm to a child
and a healthy child; it may be between a risk of harm to a child or no child being born at all.
Finally, our willingness to consider limiting the options for the infertile stands in sharp
contrast to our treatment of the fertile. Many people carry risks of serious genetic diseases, which
they chance passing on to their children. Yet no legislation requires even genetic testing of the
parents or preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), which would allow the parents to screen out
embryos carrying the diseases, let alone attempts to prohibit these individuals from procreating.240
Nor have scholars advocated for mandatory genetic testing.241
IV. REDUCING MULTIPLE BIRTHS WITHOUT UNDERMINING WOMEN’S
AUTONOMY: CONSIDERING THE OPTIONS
The goal of reducing multiple births is a worthy one, and legislative limits are not
without some merit. They doubtless would reduce the number of multiple births resulting from
IVF, and they might give “cover” to physicians who have trouble resisting patient entreaties to
exceed the appropriate number of embryos. A bill like Missouri H.B. 810, which would give
ASRM guidelines the force of law, would presumably still allow physicians to take into account
decision to forgo potentially life-saving treatment for a child, may be deemed so risky to the child’s future well-being that
it triggers court intervention.”); In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972) (finding state has insufficient interest in overruling
parent’s religious objection to treatment when child’s life not in immediate danger).
238

See, e.g., In re Cabrera 552 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. 1989) (affirming court order for transfusion of child
with sickle-cell disease to avoid 80% probability of future strokes likely to cause mental retardation, paralysis, loss of
speech or death); In re Sampson, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) (upholding order of treatment over parental
religious objection for surgery to correct condition causing massive disfigurement).
239

Adam Lamparello, Taking God Out of the Hospital: Requiring Parents to Seek Medical Care for Their
Children Regardless of Religious Belief, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 47, 48 (2001).
240

Mary Louise Hayes, Experts Debate the Use of Some Genetic Testing, WORCESTER TELEGRAM &
GAZETTE, May 4, 1989 at Life/Style Section (examining the consequences of genetic testing and inheriting Huntington’s,
bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s, and Tay-Sachs); Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub.L.
No. 110-233 (prohibiting insurance companies and employers from discriminating on the basis of information from
genetic tests); Mayo Clinic Staff, Huntington’s Disease, MAYO CLINIC (May 8, 2009), http://www.mayoclinic.com
/health/huntingtonsdisease/DS00401/DSECTION=prevention (recommending genetic counseling or in vitro fertilization
with pre-implantation screening); Sen. Brown, Rep. Arcuri Introduce Bill to Raise Awareness of Tay-Sachs Disease, US
FED NEWS SERV., Aug. 1, 2009, available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1812791251.html (describing a bill to
designate September as National Tay-Sachs Awareness Month).
241

Some have suggested voluntary screening. See Suriya E.P. Jayanti, Guarantors of Our Genes: Are Egg
Donors Liable For Latent Genetic Disease? 58 AM. U. L. REV. 405, 411, 456-57 (2008) (arguing that egg donors should
not be held to a duty to warn of known genetic disorder but fertility clinic doctors and egg donation agencies should
properly screen egg donors); RUTH SCHWARTZ COWAN, HEREDITY AND HOPE: THE CASE FOR GENETIC SCREENING
(2008); Sonia M. Suter, Whose Genes are These Anyway? Familial Conflicts Over Access to Genetic Information 91
MICH. L. REV. 1854, 1905 (1993) (examining the state interest in protecting people from preventable or curable disease
using genetic testing).
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the needs of particular patients.
Nonetheless, legislating restrictions on embryo transfer at this point would be a grave
mistake for a host of reasons. First, as we have seen, mandated embryo transfer limits raise
serious constitutional questions.242 Women affected by the limits can mount a strong case that
such legislation violates their fundamental right to procreate, although the outcome remains
uncertain. Beyond these constitutional concerns, the circumstances surrounding the introduction
of these bills do not inspire confidence that they were carefully considered. Rather, they mark a
visceral reaction to an extreme case. While we may desire to reduce the number of multiple births
from IVF, using the cudgel of legislation to achieve that goal seems premature at this point.243
Multiple births appear to be holding steady or on the decline,244 and publicity regarding the
octuplets may hasten that trend. One reproductive endocrinologist commented that her patients
were showing an increased concern with the number of embryos transferred as “no one wants to
be the Octomom.”245 In addition, the profession seems more ready to police itself, which should
deter physicians from overly aggressive transfers. Compliance with ASRM and SART
requirements has clearly contributed to a decline in the rate of multiple births.246 Although
membership in SART is voluntary, the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of
1992247 requires reporting of success rates to SART, and more than 90% of all clinics report more
than 95% of all cycles.248 Clinics that do not report are identified. Members of SART have
increasingly followed SART guidelines, including those regarding embryo transfers. Member
clinics that have results outside these guidelines must “explain the reasons to SART, develop a
plan for corrective action and demonstrate improved results in the future, or else lose their SART
membership.249 Moreover, improved ART techniques may lead to significant changes in the
guidelines and may obviate the need for regulatory limits. For example, researchers at Stanford
Medical School have developed a computer model that can predict the live birth success of an
IVF cycle with 1000 times more accuracy than current age-based guidelines for patients who have
undergone a previous IVF cycle.250
Perhaps even more importantly, we should continue to oppose legislative restrictions on
embryo transfer because they undermine women’s reproductive, medical, and parental autonomy
and self-determination. As we have seen, these restrictions fall in line with other efforts by the
state to regulate women’s reproduction in a way that furthers sex inequality and oppresses women
as patients and mothers. Such legislative restrictions interpose the state in a relationship between
women and their physicians that should be one of mutual trust. Nor does Missouri’s deference to
242

See supra Part II.

243

For a discussion of the problems of legislating new technologies, specifically IVF, see generally Lyria
Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN.
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 606-07 (2005); John M. Norian, et al., An American Perspective on Single Embryo Transfer, in
SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER 276 (Jan Gerris et al., eds., 2009); Pinchuk, supra note 143, at 54.
244
245
246
247
248
249

See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
Author’s conversation with Dr. Lori Arnold, California Ctr. for Reproductive Med., Mar. 11, 2010.
Adamson, supra note 14, at 257.
42 U.S.C. § 263a-7; Pub. L. 102-493.
Adamson, supra note 14, at 256.
Adamson, supra note 14, at 257.

250

Michelle L. Brandt, New Test to Predict Success of IVF Treatment Developed at Stanford, INSIDE
STANFORD MEDICINE (July 19, 2010), http://med.stanford.edu/ism/2010/july/ivf.html (last accessed August 10, 2010).
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the medical profession constitute a panacea. By giving medical guidelines the force of law, they
transfer ultimate responsibility for the decision from the woman, where it should reside, to her
physician. This result is especially troubling when we consider that physicians have at times
contributed to the oppression of women’s reproductive freedom, as in the forced c-section cases,
and the medical establishment has exhibited its own sexist bias across a variety of issues.251
Legislative embryo transfer restrictions will extend what Michelle Oberman has identified as a
flawed paradigm of “maternal-fetal conflicts”252 to maternal-embryo conflicts. Oberman
recognized that cases of so-called maternal-fetal conflict really involve conflict between the
woman and her physician. By structuring the conflict as one between mother and fetus, the doctor
appears neutral, even though he or she has decided what is in the fetus’ best interests and may, in
fact, actively pressure or coerce the woman to acquiesce.253 In similar fashion, by legislating the
permissible number of embryos transferred, a seemingly neutral act, the state erects itself as the
future children’s protector against the desperate mother.
There is nothing unique about the fertility industry that requires this kind of regulation.
True, the woman’s actions impact her future child, but so does every decision a parent makes
regarding medical care for a child (along with an endless plethora of other decisions). The
potential effect on the future child only justifies regulation if we think children need to be
protected from their prospective mothers and that mothers cannot make a sound decision.
Likewise, instances of economic incentives for risky medical treatment abound, yet we rely on
medical ethics and the tort system, as imperfect as they are, to counter physician’s self-interest,
rather than attempt to dictate by statute specific medical procedures.254 For example, treatment of
prostate cancer depends very much on which type of physician the patient consults. A patient
who consults a radiation oncologist will likely undergo radiation treatment, while one who
consults a urologist will likely end up having surgery, and one consulting a primary care
physician may be advised to wait and see. As the author of one study noted,
Part of the reason for the emphasis on treatment . . . is the large capital
investments surgeons make for robotically assisted surgery and that radiation
therapists make for proton beam therapy or newer techniques of radiation
therapy. Moreover, current reimbursement rules do not allow physicians

251

See Ellen Waldman & Marybeth Herald, Eyes Wide Shut: Erasing Women’s Experiences from the Clinic
to the Courtroom, 28 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 285, 285-88 (2005); See also North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group,
Inc. v. San Diego Co. Sup. Ct. 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008) (holding physician’s refusal to perform artificial insemination on
unmarried lesbian could violate California anti-discrimination law).
252

Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s Fiduciary Role in MaternalFetal Conflicts, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 451, 453-54 (2000).
253

Id.

254

On the limitations of the tort system as a deterrent to sub-par medical practice, see Eleanor D. Kinney,
Administrative Law Approaches to Medical Malpractice Reform, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 45, 47-49 (2004); See generally
Kyle Miller Putting the Caps on Caps: Reconciling the Goal of Medical Malpractice Reform with the Twin Objectives of
Tort Law, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1457 (2006); Scott Forehand, Helping the Medicine Go Down: How a Spoonful of Mediation
Can Alleviate the Problems of Medical Malpractice Litigation, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 907, 907-08 (1999). But
see Moses, supra note 243, at 590 (discussing limited effectiveness of tort law for redressing problem of multiple births
from IVF).
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adequate time to educate patients about the pros and cons of the various
procedures.255
Indeed, robotic prostate surgery, which now dominates the surgical treatment options,
may in fact be riskier than traditional open prostatechtomy, but “a lot of community hospitals felt
the need to be competitive . . . and they acquired these robots and marketed them before there has
been diffusion of experience among surgeons.”256 Indeed, the notion that physicians may order
unnecessary tests or promote expensive, but risky, procedures because of concerns with
competition and compensation is so obvious as to barely warrant mention. Much more salient,
though, is the lack of empirical data to support this hypothesis in the IVF context. Indeed, several
studies demonstrate the opposite: that increased competition actually decreases high order
multiple births.257 Hence this concern cannot suffice to justify regulation of ART unless we
ignore the empirical data and regulate medical treatment in similar fashion across the board.
A better approach would look for solutions that enhance women’s reproductive and
parental power rather than undermine it. Common sense suggests that increased insurance
coverage would reduce the patient’s financial incentive for excessive embryo transfers, though the
empirical evidence on this point is not conclusive.258 Other ways to reduce financial pressure on
patients include refund programs offered by some fertility clinics, tax breaks, and expanded credit
access for fertility patients.259
255

Thomas H. Maugh II, With Prostate Cancer Treatment, Who You See Is Often What You Get, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2010, available at http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/booster_shots/2010/03/for-prostate-cancer-treatmentwho-you-see-is-often-what-you-get.html (last accessed Aug. 11, 2010).
256

Shari Roan, Minimally Invasive Prostate Surgery Carries Risk, Study Suggests, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/14/science/sci-prostate14).
257

See Melinda B. Henne & M. Kate Bundorf, The Effects of Competition on Assisted Reproductive
Technology Outcomes, 93 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1820, 1820, 1828 (2010) (finding that competition among clinics did
not lead to more aggressive embryo transfers); Anne Z. Steiner et al., Effects of Competition Among Fertility Centers on
Pregnancy and High-Order Multiple Gestation Rates, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1429, 1432 (2005) (finding increased
competition associated with decrease in high order multiple births per clinic); Barton H. Hamilton & Brian McManus,
Infertility Treatment Markets: The Effects of Competition and Policy 4-6, 24 (2007), available at
http://www.unc.edu/~mcmanusb/IVFJuly2007.pdf (finding that increased competition in fertility markets does not
increase rate of higher order multiple births). See also Robertson, supra note 49 at 482 (doubting that infertility
practitioners are more prone to promoting dangerous practices and exploiting consumers than other types of medical
practitioners).
258

A recent study found that clinics in states with comprehensive insurance mandates did tend to transfer
fewer embryos per cycle, but this difference did not automatically translate to reduced multiple birth rates. The authors
postulated that other factors were at work—particularly a change in the mix of patients: expanded insurance coverage
attracted more patients, including some with better prognosis and others with poorer prognosis. Nicole K. Banks et al.,
Insurance Mandates, Embryo Transfer, Outcomes – The Link Is Tenuous, 94 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2776, 2778 (2010)
(confirming earlier studies showing decreased embryo transfer numbers in states with comprehensive insurance mandates,
but variable impact on multiple birth rates).
Countries with state-imposed embryo transfer limits typically provide coverage or financial assistance for
fertility treatment. See, e.g., John Collins, Cost-Effectiveness of Single Embryo Transfer in Assisted Reproductive
Technology Cycles, in SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER 228 (Jan Gerris et al., eds., 2009) (discussing Belgium and Sweden);
Adamson, supra note 14, at 251 (countries with statutory regulation had “much better insurance coverage” than countries
with guidelines or no regulation; six countries have national health plans that provide complete coverage).
259

Hawkins, supra note 153, at 158.
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Enhanced education and emphasis on effective informed consent can also make a
difference. Certainly there have been cogent critiques of the limits of informed consent.
Feminists have criticized the existing model of informed consent in general as an ineffective
means of ensuring women’s autonomy, given the patriarchal domination of the medical
profession, as well as societal pressures constraining women’s self determination.260 Much of the
critique in the ART context centers on deficiencies in informed consent in collaborative
reproduction, which raises somewhat different concerns (e.g. financial coercion of donors,
unknown psychological risks) than the risk of multiples.261 But some of the potential problems
would apply to the risk of multiple births as well. In particular, the weakness of informed consent
may lie not in lack of knowledge, but in lack of appreciation of the risks and psychological
barriers to that appreciation.262 Some evidence suggests that fertility patients are very well-versed
in the risks of higher order multiples and, to a somewhat lesser degree, of twins.263 But cognitive
dissonance may lead some to discount known risks, as they do not fit with their pre-existing view
of multiples, particularly twins. Patients may have trouble making sense of the statistical data and
dealing with the complexities of the decision as well.264
While these factors may make achieving effective informed consent more difficult, they
do not justify depriving women of the right to make choices regarding their infertility treatment,
including the number of embryos to transfer.265 Recognizing these potential barriers to
260

See, e.g., Melanie Latham, The Shape of Things to Come: Feminism, Regulation and Cosmetic Surgery,
16 MED. L. REV. 437, 441 (2008).
261

See, e.g., Sonia M. Suter, Giving in to Baby Markets: Regulation without Prohibition, 16 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 217, 242-48 (2009) (arguing for bolstering of informed consent protections in context of collaborative
reproduction); Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 12223 (2009) (noting feminist critique of surrogacy contracts as lacking informed consent because of difficulty anticipating
future emotional reactions). Some go even farther, arguing that true informed consent for ART is an impossibility because
patriarchal society has socially constructed the desire for motherhood. See Rachel Anne Fenton, Catholic Doctrine Versus
Women’s Rights: The New Italian Law on Assisted Reproduction, 14 MED. L. REV. 73, 92 (2006) (discussing views of
some feminists).
Concerns about physician pressure on patients considering multifetal reduction have also emerged. Pinchuk,
supra note 143, at 42-43 (describing “one-sided” nature of informed consent between doctor and patient considering
multifetal reduction). But see Mundy, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE supra note 33, at 253-72 (describing thoughtful
process between paysicians and patients considering multifetal reduction).
On the limits of informed consent generally, see Schuck, supra note 183.
262

Pennings, supra note 171, at 202-03.

263

D’Alton, supra note 171, at 523 (discussing study by Ryan, et al., showing that for triplets, 93% of
patients surveyed knew of increased maternal risks, 77% of cerebral palsy and 56% of infant mortality; for twins, 76%
knew of maternal risks, 49% of cerebral palsy and 30% of increased risk of infant death, though 95% understood increased
risk of premature delivery).
264

Nicole Hope & Luk Rombauts, Can an Educational DVD Improve the Acceptability of Elective Single
Embryo Transfer? A Randomized Controlled Study, 94 FERTILITY & STERILITY 489, 493 (2010); Pennings, supra note
171, at 203.
265

These phenomena are not unique to patients making ART decisions. For example, parents of children
with cancer have been shown to be overoptimistic of chances of a cure, though physicians may have contributed to the
parents’ unrealistic expectations. Hope & Rombauts, supra note 265, at 494-95 (discussing J.W. Mack, et al,
Understanding of Prognosis Among Parents of Children with Cancer: Parental Optimism and the Parent-Physician
Interaction, 25 J. Clinical Oncology 1357 (2007)). Cf. Arato v. Avedon, 5 Cal.4th 1172, 858 P.2d 598, 607 (Cal. 1993)
(observing difficulty of applying general life expectancy statistics for cancer patients into meaningful data regarding
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understanding, though, can help physicians present the information in ways that patients can
comprehend and absorb. Research into how to accomplish this goal is ongoing and showing
promise. One recent study suggests that decisional aids, such as brochures and DVDs, can be
effective in translating increased knowledge into changed preferences for transfer of fewer
embryos. The study found that the desirability of twins decreased in both the group receiving the
brochure and the group viewing the DVD, but the DVD group reported a significantly greater
preference for single embryo transfer than the brochure group. The researchers postulate that part
of the enhanced impact of the DVD stemmed from the emotional impact of hearing from mothers
of twins. Using such a DVD could provide a cost-effective means of educating patients and
changing attitudes. In addition, room still exists for improvements in physician education. Some
physicians lack sufficient knowledge of certain risks associated with multiples.266 Improving
knowledge and changing attitudes among physicians can facilitate changes in patient
understanding and preferences.267 So too might providing more comprehensive counseling about
psychosocial as well as medical risks of multiples.268
V. CONCLUSION
Outliers like Nadya Suleman and Dr. Kamrava will always exist, even in a regime of
legislative prohibition. Neither public condemnation of Suleman, influenced by societal norms
about motherhood, nor the anti-abortion movement, should drive legislative policy. While the
goal of avoiding multiple births for the sake of women and their future children is one we should
embrace, we should not do so at the cost of women’s reproductive freedom and autonomy.
Legislative embryo transfer restrictions would infringe women’s constitutional right to procreate,
undercut women’s familial authority, perpetuate harmful and degrading stereotypes of infertile
women as “irrational” and render women adversaries against their future children and physicians.
No compelling reasons exist to subject infertile women and their physicians to such pernicious
and heavy-handed regulation at this time. Rather, we should focus on enhancing physician selfregulation, patient education, and informed consent. These efforts can lead to reductions in
multiple births while preserving and promoting women’s right to reproductive and medical
autonomy.

individual prognosis).
266
267

D’Alton, supra note 171, at 524.
Id.; Covington, supra note 185, at 157.

268

Covington, supra note 185, at 153-57 (identifying counseling and education [sic] as “the single most
important variable in patient decision-making regarding the number of embryos to transfer”).
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